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and Objectives of the Seminar 
The first senior policy seminar sponsored by African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC) was held in Nairobi on 30—31 March 1995. It was attended by 49 participants, 
including 25 African policy makers from 13 countries (Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea—Bissau, Guinea—Conakry, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). These included one central bank governor, one former 
governor, one vice—minister, three deputy governors and many other staff of general 
manager, director, deputy director level from central banks, finance ministries and 
planning ministries. 
The policy makers were specifically identified for their interest in policy research issues. 
They came from countries that had been a focus of AERC research or at least had 
experience of substantial macroeconomic reform (while maintaining a linguistic and 
sub—regional balance). All policy makers invited initially accepted but unfortunately, 
due to last minute IMF/ World Bank missions, four were unable to attend. A complete 
list of participants is attached as Annex B. 
The seminar had four aims: 
• To identify possible areas of policy—oriented research for AERC—funded 
researchers to consider; 
• To improve prospects for policy involvement by AERC—funded researchers; 
• To increase AERC visibility in the policy community, highlighting the 
growing capacity in the region for policy research; and 
• To provide an opportunity for policy makers and researchers to exchange 
their experiences of and views on macroeconomic policy. 
These were achieved in four ways: 
• By synthesizing and disseminating the results of AERC—funded research to 
senior policy makers; 
• By generating an interaction between the policy makers and AERC—funded 
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researchers on the results of existing AERC research; 
• By encouraging sharing of experiences among policy makers on the lessons 
and details of macroeconomic policies; and 
• By receiving feedback from policy makers on the key current policy—related 
research issues in Africa. 
The concrete outputs of the seminar were expected to be: 
• Major input into AERC's policy—oriented research agenda, in the form of 
suggestions for key priorities in each of the policy areas examined; 
• Ideas for methods and structures to promote closer collaboration among 
policy makers and researchers, both within individual countries and 
collaboratively across the continent; 
• Wider dissemination of AERC materials to policy makers, and ideas for 
forms and methods of dissemination most convenient to them; and 
• Proposals for how to follow up the seminar. 
Content and Structure 
The two-day workshop began with a formal opening by the Deputy Governor of the 
Central Bank of Kenya, Dr. Thomas Kibua, and the AERC Executive Director, Professor 
Benno Ndulu. The workshop programme is attached as Annex A. 
This was followed by five substantive sessions. The first three were organized around 
themes in which AERC has already produced a major body of policy-oriented research: 
exchange rate policy; fiscal and monetary policy and inflation; and financial policy. For 
each theme, one or two AERC researchers presented a background paper which 
synthesized the results of AERC and other recent research. The fourth session examined 
the wider overall macroeconomic research agenda (especially the design of 
macroeconomic policy programmes), focusing on the recent experience of exchange 
rate appreciation in Uganda. The fifth examined the process of interaction between 
policy makers and researchers, drawing on the AERC policy study by Joseph Hoffman. 
After each presentation, the paper was discussed by between one and three discussants, 
ensuring a balance between policy makers and researchers and between anglophone 
and francophone discussants. The comments were followed by floor discussions by 
the policy makers in which they commented on the papers, exchanged their experiences 
in designing and implementing policies and highlighted the key issues raised for policy— 
oriented research. 
Next, the meeting divided into working groups to ensure that each policy maker had a 
chance to express detailed ideas, and to identify the consensus within each group on 
the priority outputs of the seminar (policy research issues and follow—up mechanisms). 
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There were four groups: francophone, anglophone east, anglophone west and 
anglophone south. The results of the working groups were presented to a final plenary 
session and, following a response by Dr. Ibrahim Elbadawi, AERC research coordinator, 
the meeting was closed by Prof. Benno Ndulu and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
Ghana, Mrs. Nana Yeboaa. In addition, the participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire by evaluating the content and organization of the seminar, and by making 
proposals for key research areas and follow—up mechanisms. 
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Part 2 consists of the opening speech by 
Dr. Kibua. Parts 3 to 7 present summaries both of the papers presented and of the 
discussant's comments and floor discussion in each session. Part 8 summarizes the 
working group conclusions and Part 9 the participant evaluations of the seminar. Part 
10 contains follow—up recommendations for implementing the conclusions. 
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
Dr. Thomas Kibua, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, opened the seminar 
by stating how important it was for policy makers to be aware of the research available 
and how it can be utilized to the benefit of each country's agenda. The interaction 
between economic researchers and economic policy makers is vital and needs whole- 
hearted encouragement. 
Together the two groups listened and discussed issues of mutual interest — problems in 
need of answers so that policy can be directed both by research and practical experience. 
The policy makers held a wide range of responsible positions. There were central bank 
governors and deputy governors, directors of research and their assistants, and top 
officials from ministries of finance and economic planning, including one deputy 
minister. These men and women listened to the AERC researchers who presented 
syntheses of research on several topics of vital interest and importance to the policy 
makers. These included: exchange rate policy, fiscal and monetary policy and financial 
policy. One major session encompassed a broader macroeconomic research agenda, 
particularly the design of macroeconomic policy programmes. The concluding session 
focused on the process of interaction between policy makers and researchers. 
Discussions were lively and indicated clear interest and appreciation on both sides. 
The researchers were eager to hear reactions to the work and suggestions of further 
research in order to improve their policy involvement. The policy makers were keen to 
make use of the existing research, a large portion of which had been condensed into 
executive summaries for their use. They also saw the seminar as a unique opportunity 
to exchange candid views with one another and to realize that their countries had similar 
policy environments and problems which could derive solutions from sharing 
experience. 
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Sorting out priorities 
After one and a half days of detailed presentations and fruitful discussions, the 
participants formed four working groups based on geographical areas within sub- 
Saharan Africa: francophone, anglophone west, anglophone east and anglophone south. 
Each comprised both researchers and policy makers. 
From these groups, from the discussions within each session and from the seminar 
evaluations, there emerged a set of priority research issues: 
• The role of exchange rate policy in a liberalized economy, especially the scope 
for intervention in forex markets; 
• The process of budget formulation and execution, particularly new sources 
of revenue mobilization; 
• The implementation of indirect monetary policy; 
• How to encourage investment in production (with the emphasis on medium, 
small and micro enterprises) through enhanced financial sector reform, and 
the encouragement of informal financial markets; 
• The role and credibility of government; and 
• Macroeconomic responses to external shocks from excess or insufficient 
external capital flow. 
How to study these topics needs careful consideration to ensure a clear and productive 
division of labour among researchers and policy makers. Researchers could contribute 
surveys of literature and of non-African experiences, theoretical background papers, 
econometric modelling and sample surveys of private sector reactions to a variety of 
policies. Policy makers could identify key issues in each country to ensure policy 
relevance, and analyse government data, institutional capacities and current policy 
thinking. 
Many other topics and sub-topics suggested would best be pursued by sub-groups of 
countries, or policy makers and researchers. They could be fed into any future design 
of projects in these areas by AERC researchers to make them more policy relevant. 
A questionnaire was completed by the policy makers at the end of the seminar, evaluating 
its utility and suggesting improvements. The overall evaluation was extremely positive: 
one said it had been an "eye-opener" about AERC and the potential for cooperation 
among policy makers and researchers. 
• Every policy maker found the seminar worthwhile due to interaction with 
the researchers and the exchange of experiences with other policy makers. 
• All would attend another seminar, though their priorities for topics varied. 
Around half wanted a seminar on the financial sector, on fiscal and monetary 
policy or on relative roles of government and private sector; other popular 
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subjects were regional integration and trade promotion, overall macro-micro 
policies and links, and exchange rates. 
All wanted to pursue joint research projects with researchers. The top 
priorities were exchange rate policy, expanding fiscal revenue and 
overcoming financial sector distress. Other prominent issues were the role 
of government in a liberalized economy, macroeconomic sequencing, indirect 
monetary targets and policy, how to finance SMEs innovatively, investment 
and savings, private sector promotion and privatization, capital flows and 
external shocks, and informal finance. 
• All participants indicated they would be more likely to use AERC researchers 
and research materials in future policy-relevant research. 
• With one exception, they agreed that the research presented had added to 
their knowledge of policy issues, especially through the informal financial 
sector and overall macro agenda papers. 
• Again, with one exception, they agreed that the seminar had suggested 
mechanisms for interaction among policy makers and researchers in their 
own countries, including joint research, seminars, staff exchanges, 
cooperation in "policy units" or working groups, production and 
dissemination of executive summaries and data collection. 
Dissemination into the future 
The seminar was an extremely successful mechanism for disseminating knowledge of 
AERC's aims, procedures and products to policy makers. Both the seminar papers and 
the executive summaries of existing papers were very well received. The seminar was 
small in order to enhance fruitful discussion, and therefore reached relatively few policy 
makers. To disseminate the seminar results and future AERC products to a wider 
network of policy makers, several avenues were suggested for the AERC secretariat: 
• Produce three written outputs from the seminar itself: a very brief summary 
of the seminar; an edited version of the seminar report; and a full volume of 
proceedings, including the text of the papers presented. Each would target 
different audiences: the first would be useful for senior policy makers; the 
second for seminar participants, research-oriented policy makers and AERC 
researchers; and the third for all those interested in policy-oriented research 
areas. 
• Create a directory of the researchers in its network, with their research 
interests, highlighting those interested in policy issues, and circulate it to 
African research institutions and governments. 
• Make all possible efforts to widen the group of enthusiastic policy makers 
created by the seminar into a permanent network of Africans interested in 
policy research. Each of the policy maker and/or researcher participants in 
the seminar could act as a "contact point" to name other research-oriented 
policy makers in their country, particularly those in planning commissions 
and policy units, and to disseminate AERC outputs. 
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• Ensure that more of its researchers are informed of the results of the seminar, 
in order to involve them in follow-up projects. It might consider devoting a 
plenary day or half-day to presenting the papers or discussions at the senior 
policy seminar. 
• Organize more national policy workshops, and highlight the conclusions of 
the policy seminar (and any follow-up policy research projects) in such 
workshops. 
• Strengthen links with francophone policy makers. Contacts would be made 
with BCEAO and BEAC, to organize a presentation of the results of this 
senior policy seminar, and to discuss cooperation on policy-oriented research 
(especially given the seminar findings that almost all issues were similar for 
CFA and non-CFA countries). 
• Lusophone policy makers and researchers are particularly poorly served by 
research networks and AERC should remedy this gap urgently. 
All the participants expressed the strong hope that AERC would organize similar 
seminars in future, focusing more closely on individual issues and research projects. 
Several participants expressed their gratitude to AERC for giving them such a valuable 
opportunity. To quote one policy maker, "We all came away different". The researchers 
also had a first time opportunity to engage in real dialogue with those who design and 
implement policy — they were "a window to the real world". 
2. 
Opening Session 
Opening remarks by 
Dr. Thomas N. Kibua 
Deputy Governor 
Central Bank of Kenya 
The executive director, distinguished participants, members of the AERC, ladies and 
gentlemen 
First, I would like to express my appreciation for the invitation extended to me to 
officially open this seminar. Before touching on issues relevant to the theme of the 
seminar, let me take this opportunity to thank the sponsors and AERC for convening 
this workshop. It is an important forum because it will enable participants to exchange 
views and experiences on macroeconomic policy issues, particularly those arising from 
the structural adjustment programmes being implemented by most African countries. 
During the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, sub-Saharan economies experienced serious 
economic and financial difficulties. These manifested themselves in high inflation, 
inability to balance external obligations with external receipts, protracted economic 
stagnation and worsening poverty conditions. These economic problems were partly 
due to such exogenous factors as unfavourable terms of trade and poor weather 
conditions. However, the main underlying factors were structural bottlenecks associated 
with the inappropriate economic policies pursued in the first 20-25 years of their 
independence. 
In recognition of these difficulties, several African governments have implemented 
structural adjustment reforms in order to improve the adaptability and flexibility of 
their economies so as to reverse the downward trend in growth. Both macro and 
microeconomic reforms have been implemented. The macroeconomic aspects entail 
ensuring that there is a stable macroeconomic environment for structural reforms to 
take root. In this regard, reforming economies have taken measures to reduce imbalances 
between overall supply of goods and services and their demand. The imbalances have 
manifested themselves in rising inflation and unsustainable balance of payments deficits. 
Unsustainable balance of payments have in turn taken the form of shortages of foreign 
exchange and the associated build-up of external debt arrears. Measures to address 
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these problems in the context of structural reforms include tight fiscal and monetary 
policies to: 
• Reduce government expenditure on various items including subsidies; 
• Broaden the tax base; and 
• Tighten conditions for availability of credit to restrain monetary expansion. 
These measures are designed to provide the macroeconomic framework for improving 
the productivity of the private sector. The reforms persistently pursued are expected to 
pull the economies out of their present state of economic stagnation and poverty. The 
major structural reforms include: 
• Removal of price controls 
• Liberalization of marketing of agricultural and petroleum products 
• Removal of import licensing 
• Liberalization of current and capital accounts of the balance of payments 
• Removal of control on exchange rate 
• Liberalization of interest rates 
• Removal of quantitative credit controls 
• Introduction of indirect monetary policy instruments 
• Strengthening of supervisory capacity of central banks 
• Restructuring of weak financial institutions 
• Privatization and restructuring of public enterprises 
• Rationalization of civil service 
The reforms have considerably enhanced the investment environment of our economies. 
Although their full impact is bound to take time, notable gains have been made in 
restoring macroeconomic stability, and in some countries prospects for renewed growth 
are high. For example, the high inflation that characterized most economies has been 
reduced while the level of foreign exchange reserves in terms of months of import cover 
has risen. 
The reforms have, however, generated new challenges, which must be addressed 
promptly if we are to consolidate the gains already made and ensure further progress. 
I wish to illustrate these challenges with Kenya's experiences with which I am more 
familiar. 
• We have in the last two years pursued a tight monetary policy in order to 
reduce inflation from the high levels that prevailed in mid-1993 to the single- 
digit range. We have used mainly the cash ratio and open market operations 
(OMO) instruments of monetary policy. We have been using treasury bills 
as the main instrument for OMO. To get people to invest in this instrument, 
we had to offer attractive yields. Consequently, the yield, which was about 
17% in February 1993, rose to 71% in July 1993. Although the rate has since 
come down substantially, the increase made the task of managing fiscal policy 
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very difficult. Interest payments on domestic debt took about 44% of 
government recurrent revenue in FY 1993/94. This meant we had to reduce 
capital and other recurrent expenditures in order to ensure that the overall 
budget deficit remained within the level consistent with the macroeconomic 
objectives we had set to achieve. 
The high yields on treasury bills also led to large capital inflows as people 
who previously held funds abroad brought them back to cash in on the high 
returns. This complicated the management of monetary and exchange rate 
policies. Because these capital inflows could not immediately be absorbed 
by the economy, they led to sharp appreciation of the shilling. While this 
development has certainly been welcomed by the importers and consumers, 
exporters have not been amused as it has led to a reduction in their earnings. 
This poses a challenge to researchers as well as those responsible for economic 
management. There is need to improve our techniques of exchange rate 
management so that we maintain a rate that will spur production of exports 
and import substitutes without putting undue pressure on domestic prices. 
Another area of concern is the failure of interest rates to respond quickly to 
the decline in inflation. Despite the sharp fall in inflation from the three 
digit level prevalent in June 1993 to a single, digit level presently, lending 
rates have barely come down. Banks are currently charging on average 25% 
per cent for their loans, allowing a spread of 10%. This is excessively high 
and poses a major constraint to expected expansion in investment. There is 
need to know what could be done within a liberalized framework to have 
banks reduce their lending rates. 
• The opening of our economy has generated competition for local industry. 
While this may enhance efficiency, concern has been raised that cheap imports 
are being dumped in the country, thereby killing domestic industry. The 
issue that arises is how we can liberalize the trade system in order to promote 
efficient use of resources without adversely affecting our efforts to promote 
local industry. 
• It is becoming increasingly clear that structural reforms have to go beyond 
commitment to particular macroeconomic policy framework and systems of 
mobilizing and using resources to having institutions attuned to those 
reforms. In the process of reform we have not only emphasized the role of 
the private sector but also the significant reduction of the government 
presence in many spheres of economic activity. In my view, we have to go 
further and reform institutions to align them to a liberal economic 
environment. I have in mind the need to rationalize and have clear-cut 
responsibilities of government departments, including creation of a well- 
trained and effective civil service. There is urgent need to address the issue 
of work ethics within the civil service and in the country at large. There is 
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need to promote professionalism and wider national and regional interest 
as a basis for accelerated economic development. 
• The thorniest issue of adjustment is the social costs associated with such 
measures as elimination of subsidies and retrenchment in the public sector. 
How do we minimize these costs? This brings into focus such issues as the 
pace of implementation of the reforms and their sequencing. Should we go 
for a shock or gradual therapy type of reform strategy? Little research has 
been done to assess the impact of these reform strategies. Such knowledge 
is important as it would help the process of designing programmes that are 
more appropriate to our own situation. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the need to diversify our economies in favour of increased share 
of manufacturing must be emphasized. However, our small domestic markets remain 
a major constraint. In this context, steps must be taken to encourage regional cooperation 
to create a wider market. For such actions to yield the desired results and for the sake 
of balanced trade, it is necessary that co-operating countries harmonize their fiscal, 
exchange rate and trade policies. This requires coordination of policy-oriented research 
and active involvement of senior policy makers. It also requires unwavering will and 
commitment by our political leaders. 
Before I conclude, let me raise one additional issue that I consider important and feel 
that the participants should take time to discuss. There is urgent need for African 
researchers to reorient their research activities to focus more on economic problems 
facing our countries. They need to be more practical in providing alternative policy 
actions that are implementable. Their research reports, which form the basis of policy 
formulation, should be precise, unambiguous and simple. It is only in these ways that 
they can be useful for policy reorientation. 
In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that I attach a lot of importance to this seminar. I am 
confident that at the end of the programme you will have greatly enhanced your 
understanding and appreciation of the issues I have raised and should be able to come 
up with practical policy recommendations to address them. I know the issues to be 
discussed are challenging and require that you take them seriously, given the urgent 
need to improve the performance of our economies. However, I would urge you to 
find time to tour the city of Nairobi and our countryside to see whatever progress we 
have made. 
With these few remarks, ladies and gentlemen, I now declare this seminar officially 
open and wish you fruitful deliberations. 
3. 
Exchange Rate Policy 
(non-CFA and CFA foreign 
exchange markets) 
Authors and Presenters: C. Dordunoo, Ghana 
A. M'Bet, Côte d'Ivoire 
Summary of paper 
Introduction 
Until the mid-1980s, fixed exchange rates were seen by many African governments as 
desirable to ensure currency stability. However, more recently, most have realized the 
cost to competitiveness of fixed rates . They have moved to flexible exchange rates, 
first through administered systems such as step devaluations and crawling pegs, and 
in many cases through market-oriented systems such as foreign exchange auctions and 
interbank markets. At the same time, most governments have left foreign exchange 
allocation to the market, in order to generate more efficient resource allocation and use. 
However, the shift away from fixed exchange rates is not the final step. It raises several 
fundamental questions about future policy — not least because a market-determined 
exchange rate is no longer a separate policy tool, but the outcome of external and 
domestic trends and policy measures. The key questions are: 
• What should be the policy target? the nominal exchange rate, the real rate, 
or unifying parallel and official rates? depreciation to increase 
competitiveness or stability to reduce inflation? 
• What are the causes and effects of changes in exchange rates? 
• What are the most effective mechanisms for achieving the policy target? step 
devaluations or crawling pegs? auctions or interbank markets? rapid changes 
or gradual changes? 
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This paper draws on AERC and other research into the experiences of CFA and non- 
CFA countries to attempt to provide preliminary answers and to suggest areas where 
policy makers and researchers need to know more. 
The exchange rate target 
The main choice of target is between the nominal exchange rate (units of national 
currency per unit of foreign currency) and the real exchange rate (adjusted for relative 
inflation in national and international prices). Because the real exchange rate is the 
more accurate measure of international competitiveness, it should be the policy target. 
Of course, adjusting the real rate is almost certain to require changes in the nominal 
rate. The CFA countries suffered in the 1980s from trying to maintain competitive real 
rates by only internal adjustment measures. As a result, the inflation gains from a 
stable nominal rate were offset by output losses. 
Most countries have started the adjustment process with highly overvalued exchange 
rates, and they have usually needed to devalue considerably to restore competitiveness. 
The ultimate goal should be a stable real rate, to minimize inflationary effects and 
maximize the credibility of government policy, which would enhance private sector 
supply response. Nevertheless, the specific target for stability remains unclear. 
The other goal of recent exchange rate changes has been to unify the rates in the "official" 
markets and the "ex-parallel" bureau markets, by having one market-determined rate. 
This is not necessarily compatible with a stable real rate; if there are sudden or sustained 
large rises or falls in supply of foreign exchange to either the interbank or the bureau 
market, this may force the currency to appreciate or depreciate away from stability or 
undermine the unification of the two markets. 
Causes of real exchange rate changes 
Real exchange rates are influenced by two sets of factors: 
• External shocks beyond the control of national decision makers. Research 
results indicate that the most significant negative shock is change in the terms 
of trade. Growth in trading partner countries, changes in foreign interest 
rates and capital inflows are also important in some countries. 
• Other macro policies. Trade liberalization, a more open economy and higher 
absorption will depreciate the exchange rate. Tighter monetary and interest 
rate (and to a lesser extent fiscal) policies have the opposite effect. Inflation, 
GDP growth, exports and imports have mixed impact depending on the 
countries and time periods examined. 
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Effects of real exchange rate changes 
The evidence on the effects of real exchange rate changes is mixed for most variables, 
and hard to separate from the wider effects of structural adjustment programmes. In 
the franc zone, it is generally too early to judge results with any clarity. Elsewhere, 
there has been a correlation between depreciation and capital inflows (aid and private), 
and between depreciation and export growth. The volume of imports has also risen 
sharply, resulting in wider trade and current account deficits. Exchange rate measures 
alone cannot elicit the desired balance of payments outcome. They need to be 
supplemented with compatible macroeconomic, export promotion and import 
rationalization policies. 
Liberalized exchange rate regimes have usually coincided with GDP growth, but with 
varying effects on agricultural, industrial and service sectors. Particularly for agriculture, 
changes in the RER may be inadequate to increase production and exports. If Africa is 
to be competitive, complementary structural and institutional measures are needed to 
improve infrastructure, input supplies and market information for the real sectors, and 
to decrease their production costs. Even with all these measures, non-tariff barriers 
and overconcentration on a few commodities may undermine export earnings. 
One crucial link between causes and impact is the effect of a nominal exchange rate 
depreciation on the real rate. Analysis shows that the trade-off between competitiveness 
and inflation is very real. Large devaluations may produce a sharp rise in inflation, 
though this may not be sufficient to prevent some real exchange rate depreciation. 
Gradual depreciations are likely to have less inflationary risk and therefore more real 
effect in the longer term. Monetary, fiscal and supply-enhancing measures are also 
needed to reduce the risk of inflation. 
Mechanisms for change 
The immediate problems here are different for CFA and non-CFA countries. In the 
CFA zone (if there is to be any more devaluation), the debate is over which flexible but 
administered exchange rate system to use. On balance, a crawling peg linked to the 
ECU or a wider basket would seem preferable to minimize inflation and maximize real 
depreciation. The second question is the role of a currency zone with nominal 
devaluation, which will exacerbate divergences between members' real rates due to 
the different terms of trade shocks, economic fundamentals and capacities to respond 
to devaluation. 
Outside the franc zone, debate continues about the relative merits of different types of 
market-determined systems — mainly auction and interbank systems. Some evidence 
favours operating them as a sequence, with retail auctions followed by wholesale 
auctions and then interbank markets. However, it is clear that the success of these 
mechanisms has depended on gradual introduction, careful implementation, early large 
foreign exchange flows and compatible fiscal and monetary policies. 
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Research is clear that the foreign exchange bureaux introduced to legalize and monitor 
"parallel market" flows have been extremely positive. But, while foreign exchange 
markets have become more efficient (judged by their effects on the parallel market and 
capital flight) as a result of interbank and bureau markets, these markets remain 
segmented even in the most liberalized countries. In addition, in many countries the 
bureau markets are continuing to grow rapidly, contrary to expectations and intentions 
when they were introduced, while in others they have stabilized. Reasons for these 
differing trends remain unclear. 
Issues for further research 
Overall, the causes and effects of exchange rate changes have been well researched 
(except for the effects of devaluation in the franc zone). But the results remain sufficiently 
divergent that more study of detailed country-specific circumstances would be 
worthwhile, especially to monitor and explain short-term volatility in real exchange 
rates. 
The key research issue must be when and how African governments should aim for a 
stable real rate. This will involve much more micro-level analysis of: 
• The causes and effects of continued segmentation into official and "bureau" 
markets; 
• The tension between the stable real exchange rate target and the unification 
of exchange rates; and 
• The operation of the foreign exchange markets and participants. 
The aim of such research would be to establish guidelines for constant micro analysis 
of the functioning of the foreign exchange, money and capital markets, to provide policy 
makers with an early warning system about trends in capital flows and other variables, 
so that they can gauge what should be the short-term aims of exchange rate policy. 
CFA zone research needs to tackle the same issues, but will require slightly different 
frameworks, including: 
• More analysis of the effects of the recent devaluation; 
• The relative effects of crawling pegs and step devaluations; and 
• The lessons of free-market exchange rates in non-CFA countries. 
Overall, CFA and non-CFA countries face many of the same problems and should 
certainly study them together. We should take advantage of the regional network of 
AERC and the policy makers at this seminar to include a regional dimension in any 
project: 
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• How do competitive devaluations affect neighbouring countries, and (how) 
can exchange rate policies be harmonized to minimize economic disruption? 
• What is the role of currency zones in harmonizing policies, and how will we 
achieve longer-term monetary integration across the continent or in sub- 
regions? 
Comments and Discussion 
Discussant 1: Dr. C. Kimei, Bank of Tanzania 
Dr. Kimei commented that there is still no consensus on the ideal exchange rate regime 
or level, or above all on the objective(s) of exchange rate policy. Objectives are generally 
to improve the balance of payments and competitiveness through devaluation or to 
reduce inflation through stability (or both at different stages). These often conflict. In 
Tanzania, exchange rate liberalization and devaluation had improved the 
competitiveness of exports but did not reduce imports and therefore failed to improve 
the balance of payments. Inflation had not improved. 
Second, he questioned whether it was possible to implement an objective by intervening 
in the foreign exchange market. Most African countries have insufficient foreign 
exchange reserves to combat external shocks (aid shortfalls or private capital inflows). 
In order to maintain a target, he suggested a crawling peg rather than a market rate for 
the CFA zone. In addition, the real exchange rate based on economic fundamentals is 
difficult to identify and therefore to target; a better guideline might be a stable nominal 
rate combined with low inflation. On the other hand, countries where competitiveness 
is the main aim might need to follow the example of the Asian Tigers and over-depreciate 
to get an export response. 
Third, he suggested that unification of the official and parallel markets might not be the 
overriding objective. A small continuing differential between official and bureau rates 
is almost inevitable, due to different transaction costs and financial risks. He suggested 
the following areas for further research: 
• The exchange rate regime that is most viable for different African countries, 
given their circumstances — crawling pegs, free floats, managed floats, 
currency boards, external anchors, etc.? 
• The credibility of the exchange rate rule — how does the private sector respond 
to government signals on the desired exchange rate? 
• Prospects and methods of harmonizing exchange rate and other 
macroeconomic policies in Africa (or sub-regions). 
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Dascussant 2: Dr. I. Elbadawi, AERC 
Dr. Elbadawi concentrated on the CFA zone. Though devaluation in 1994 had been 
essential, because domestic policy could not offset the negative effects of over-valuation, 
its successful transmission into increased competitiveness now depends on reducing 
labour costs, producing agricultural supply response and providing external debt relief. 
Devaluation is not a panacea; subsequent fiscal or monetary expansion would negate 
its effects, and accompanying structural measures are needed. 
Monetary integration in the CFA zone remains highly positive because it coordinates 
macro policy, ensures convertibility and provides an external anchor. Though until the 
devaluation it had the disadvantage of removing the exchange rate as a policy 
instrument, this also appears to be partly true for the liberalized systems in non—CFA 
countries. There is therefore an urgent need for research on the implications of this loss 
of an instrument for monetary integration in Africa (especially because Africa is being 
marginalized by some international organizations and in the world economy). Finally, 
further research is needed on whether the CFA zone should move from the French 
franc to the ECU as an anchor — and whether an anchor might encourage excessive 
external dependence. 
Discussant 3: Dr. F. Mwega, University of Nairobi 
Dr. Mwega discussed the recent move to market regimes, based on the Kenyan 
experience. The key current issues are the desirable degree of convertibility (capital 
account or only current account), and the timing and methodology of expanding 
convertibility. Other concerns are the desirability and feasibility of intervention in the 
foreign exchange market and the trade-off between a stable rate as an anti-inflation 
anchor and depreciation to promote competitiveness. Finally the question is whether 
stability is more important than attaining a particular rate. 
Each country needs to study these issues for itself and decide on its targets, objectives, 
intervention mechanisms and convertibility policy. This study would best be achieved 
by policy makers and researchers working together, dividing their labour in order to 
tackle immediate policy issues and longer—term economic fundamentals. 
Discussion from the Floor 
The discussion revolved around the feasibility of intervention in the foreign exchange 
markets and how to identify an appropriate rate. Some participants suggested that 
other macro variables (e.g., inflation) should be targeted instead of the exchange rate. 
They saw demand for forex as unclear, and supply of forex as distorted by large aid or 
private capital inflows (though some suggested that private capital inflows produced a 
realistic rate). In addition, the lack of timely accurate data on the determinants and 
effects of exchange rate changes make it harder to identify an appropriate real rate. 
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Others suggested that other policies could stabilize supply and especially demand, 
and therefore a broad target range is feasible with limited intervention. Any declared 
target must be adhered to in order to ensure policy credibility. While some proposed a 
return to crawling pegs, others indicated there might be intervention in markets to 
ensure a minimum of stability (without betting against the market). Overall, there was 
consensus that the question of intervention/targeting merits further urgent research. 
On effects, some participants suggested that the current exchange rate volatility and 
depreciation affects investment and manufacturing negatively, and that import 
dependence is not falling as expected. Others said that these trends and negative effects 
will end once structural imbalances and external dependence are corrected; the exchange 
rate cannot fulfil multiple objectives on its own. Therefore, in the interim, other structural 
measures, not relying excessively on the exchange rate, should be implemented to 
enhance competitiveness with a special focus to promote small and medium enterprises 
that are less hit by import price rises due to devaluation. 
CFA issues were discussed only briefly (due to limited CFA representation at the 
seminar). Some participants suggested that rumours of another CFA devaluation might 
be causing parallel markets to persist in CFA countries. They cautioned that external 
pegging was proving difficult even in Europe. There is need for continual reevaluation 
of the external anchor. 

4. 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Authors and Presenters: N. Osoro, Tanzania 
N. Sowa, Ghana 
Summary of Paper 
Introduction 
Since the mid—I 980s, most African nations have been trying — with varying degrees of 
success — to reduce fiscal deficits and control monetary growth, reversing the excessive 
government spending and money supply expansion of earlier years. One major goal of 
these measures has been to reduce inflation. 
This paper draws on empirical research commissioned by AERC, and other analysis of 
this set of policies. The purpose has been to extract the findings that are of most interest 
to African policy makers, and to identify the key policy areas that require further research 
to guide implementation. The further aim is to find areas on which policy makers and 
researchers can collaborate most effectively. The paper looks first at fiscal policy then 
at monetary policy and inflation. 
Fiscal policy 
The key issues in fiscal policy are fiscal structure (revenue, expenditure and deficits as 
a proportion of GDP) and macroeconomic effects of fiscal deficits. Other major concerns 
are relationships between revenue, expenditure and deficits; measures to cut expenditure 
and measures to increase revenue and reform tax administration. 
Fiscal structure. African countries have not only been spending excessively, many have 
extremely low revenue to GDP ratios. However, counties divide broadly into those 
with high current expenditure to GDP and revenue to GDP (excluding grants) ratios, 
such as Malawi and Tanzania; and those with low expenditure/GDP and tax/GDP 
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ratios, such as Ghana and Uganda. Different methods of measuring deficits, revenue 
(including grants) and expenditure (including capital expenditure) may give very 
different pictures. More research is needed to define the most appropriate measurements 
and sustainable targets. 
Deficit effects. Apart from the negative effects on monetary growth, fiscal deficits can 
worsen external balance by increasing government imports. They may also raise interest 
rates by competing for domestic savings. Yet many governments have had little success 
in reducing the primary deficit (excluding grants and interest). Researchers and policy 
makers need to examine which methods of defict reduction are the most effective; 
Relationships between revenue, expenditure and deficits. These have been extensively 
tested. There appears to be a one-way causation, with increases in revenue provoking 
offsetting increases in revenue. Deficit reduction therefore needs to stress expenditure 
cuts. Also, increases in deficits increase spending, especially when they are financed 
cheaply by borrowing because demand for public goods increases due to their lower 
tax price. More analysis is needed to disaggregate the expenditure and revenue variables 
and test their links in detail;. 
Expenditure reduction. AERC research indicates that spending cuts need to be 
undertaken with care, because recurrent expenditure cuts are difficult to achieve and 
capital expenditure cuts can have a major negative impact on growth. Any capital 
expenditure cuts should be in unproductive defence and prestige areas. Again, more 
disaggregation is needed to see where cuts cause the minimum negative effects on 
GDP growth. 
Revenue raising and tax administration. AERC has conducted extensive work on the 
design and effects of tax reform in Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda. Tax reform 
has aimed to increase revenue, protect against imports, maintain equity, promote 
investment, simplify the tax system and improve tax administration. The major factor 
in more successful tax reforms (Ghana and Uganda) has been wholehearted 
improvement of tax administration, which has improved tax yield and revenue 
productivity far more than reducing rates. The less successful reforms (Malawi and 
Tanzania) have focused on increasing tax rates and introducing new taxes to broaden 
the base but have not improved administration. 
Administration of expenditure. The desirable composition of expenditure cuts as 
outlined in planned budgets is often frustrated by political and administrative processes. 
These make social sector spending a "soft" target for cuts during budget implementation, 
and defense and domestic/external interest payments "hard" targets. Policy makers 
and researchers need to work together to identify optimal improvements in the 
administration of both tax and expenditure, particularly in the context of the current 
moves in many countries to decentralize both functions. 
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Monetary policy and inflation 
The key issues here are the effectiveness of interest rates in monetary control and the 
relative roles of deficit financing/monetary growth and other factors in inflation. Also 
of great concern are the optimal level of inflation for tax seigniorage and government 
ability to control money supply through indirect monetary policy. 
Interest rate effectiveness. Studies indicate that interest rates may be effective tools of 
monetary control. Except in Kenya, money demand in Africa has shown weak interest 
sensitivity, and investment has shown stronger sensitivity. However, these results may 
be partly the result of tracking negative real rates and other policies of financial 
repression, the thin financial markets, and inaccurate monetary data. More 
disaggregation and empirical analysis are needed. 
Deficits, money and inflation. Deficit financing is strongly linked to monetary growth, 
as indicated by research on Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Money supply is one 
major cause of inflation, through it has often been of secondary importance compared 
to shortage of goods or output. Governments should concentrate equally on policies to 
enhance supply, especially food production. Research has been very limited, on non- 
monetary components of inflation and effective policies to combat them. 
Inflation and seigniorage. It is vital for all governments to identify the revenue- 
maximising rate of inflation in their country, in order to maximise tax revenue while 
controlling inflation. Empirical work in this area has covered only a few African 
countries, and needs to be extended to others. 
Indirect monetary policy. Attempts to contain monetary growth through indirect 
monetary policy measures in a liberalized financial system, have met with minimal 
success. The effects of liberalizing interest rates and issuing government or central 
bank bills have been undermined by the thinness and undervelopment of financial 
markets. Distressed banking systems, the volatility of money demand and multipliers 
as well as elements of reserve money beyond central bank control compound the 
problem. Research on this area is at an early stage, and further work should be a priority. 
Comments and Discussion 
Discussant 1: Deputy Minister Selormey, 
Ministry of Finance, Ghana 
Minister Selormey raised three fundamental problems: 
• Dependence on volatile international trade taxes because low incomes reduce 
income tax. He stressed the need for research on indirect taxes, notably VAT, 
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which had low collection costs and guidelines for monitoring and collecting 
such taxes for small and medium enterprises and self—employed people. 
• How to reduce expenditure by limiting it to core government functions (social 
and economic infrastructure, defence and administration) and leave the rest 
(notably production) to the private sector. Cuts should in theory focus on 
recurrent expenditures, especially personal emoluments (by reducing the 
size of the civil service) and subsidies to parastatals. But higher incentives 
for remaining staff often offset cuts in staff numbers, and privatization is 
proving protracted in most countries. Capital expenditures are too low 
already in many countries, but are often the first to be cut due to external 
finance shortfalls. 
• How to turn research findings and concepts in the paper such as the "optimal 
revenue—generating rate of inflation" and "interest rate sensitivity of money 
demand and investment" into operational policy ideas. The current findings 
are of questionable policy relevance. 
Discussant 2: Mr. B. Fall, Ministry of Finance, Senegal 
Mr. Fall referred to Senegal's generally successful tax reform, but reinforced the view 
that VAT is difficult to collect, especially from the informal sector, though Senegal had 
had some success. He stressed the need to consult the business community (and other 
target groups) before tax changes, to maximize revenue and transparency and reduce 
evasion. He also proposed more research into the longer—term sustainability of fiscal 
reforms and the identification of desirable levels of revenue and expenditure to GDP, 
based on the experiences of other (including non—African) countries. 
He suggested that budget implementation is much more vital than budget design. Most 
analysis of budget policy is of the voted budget, but the amount and the composition of 
expenditure are often very different, and it is necessary to understand why. Finally, he 
saw a need for a study into how to achieve budgetary convergence among the UMOA 
countries to reinforce monetary and exchange rate complementarity. 
Discussant 3: Dr. K. Oussou, University of Côte d'Ivoire 
Dr. Oussou stressed the weight of external and internal debt service in expenditure. 
He asked for more research on the scope to cut this rather than other expenditure. 
Second, he emphasized the need to focus on revenue mobilization and widening the 
tax base particularly to the informal sector which might eventually provide up to 20% 
of revenue, and to land taxes and to crack down on tax evasion and fraud. Third, there 
is need for more work on how to reduce or eliminate the fiscal burden caused by loss— 
making public enterprises — and whether they could be made net contributors to the 
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budget. Fourth, he suggested we should be looking at the quality rather than the quantity 
of expenditure. For example, cuts in recurrent expenditure may undermine the provision 
of remaining public services. Finally, he advocated a comparative study on the effect of 
the CFA zone's restrictions on printing money to finance budget deficits, and on whether 
there was room to soften the current fixed limits on CFA borrowing to finance deficits. 
Discussion from the Floor 
Several other revenue raising measures were suggested: 
• Reducing corruption (smuggling/embezzlement); 
• Cutting tax rates (though some doubted the efficacy of this); and 
• Using personal tax identification numbers. 
The importance of an autonomous revenue authority, with better remuneration of staff, 
was emphasized, though this was not a panacea. In this context, it is imperative that 
government demonstrate fairness and transparency in tax collection. Unfairness in 
poii taxes reduces collection in some countries. 
• Pre—shipment inspection of imports; and 
• Slashing officially authorized tax exemptions. 
A number of expenditure measures were also proposed: 
• Focusing cuts on defence, security and general administration; 
• Concentrating expenditure on social sectors, human resource—building and 
poverty alleviation; 
• Designing administrative reform in ways that would retain existing 
capacity and combat the brain drain; and 
• Keeping down domestic debt and reducing external debt, to maximize scope 
for development—oriented expenditure. 
The theme underlying the whole discussion was the need for research into the details 
of expenditure and revenue measures, rather than the overall aggregates. Other 
participants stressed research on the interactions between tax policy and other policies. 
For example, high corporate taxes should not offset export or investment incentives. 
They also asked for research on the desirable ratio of tax to GDP, which ranged in 
participating countries from under 10% to over 30%. Several questioned whether interest 
rates were effective instruments of monetary control in Africa; whether there was a 
"revenue—maximizing" inflation rate; and how/whether the findings of the paper should 
be used in setting target inflation levels, developing fiscal budgets or intervening on 
interest rates. Finally, there was wide agreement on the need for research on the 




Financial Sector Policy 
A: The Formal Financial Sector 
Financial Sector Reform 
Author and Presenter: A. Soyibo, Nigeria 
Summary of Paper 
Introduction 
Financial sector reforms in Africa have led to an increase in the number and variety of 
financial institutions, as well as some improvement in macro aggregates such as the 
measure of financial deepening, M2/GDP and the real interest rate. However, there 
has been no significant improvement in the maturity structure of deposit liabilities of 
financial institutions. Consequently, the problem of asset-liability mismatch persists 
in the system because the demand for investment funds, often long-term, has not 
diminished. This paper makes a case for the establishment of a long-standing forum of 
policy makers and researchers provide research support for policy making. The forum 
would be fed with policy research results aimed at improving policy design and 
implementation and would also help researchers to address research issues relevant to 
policy making. 
The paper first examines elements of financial sector liberalization that formed the 
framework for evaluating financial sector reforms in Africa and then summarizes 
research results of AFRC and other relevant networks evaluating financial liberalization 
in Africa. It considers policy issues or options emerging from the study and suggests 
an approach for establishing policy-research linkages. 
Elements of financial sector liberalization 
Financial programmes can be classified as either basic or comprehensive. The basic 
programme focuses mainly on the issue of positive response of savings (and economic 
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growth) to interest rate. It is thus mainly concerned with dismantling credit and interest 
rate ceilings and the policy of directed credit. Comprehensive reform programmes are 
much broader in scope and have many varieties. At minimum, a comprehensive 
financial sector reform programme should put into place strengthened prudential 
regulations and improved bank supervision to mitigate adverse consequences of interest 
rate liberalization. It should also institute the policy of exchange rate reforms. Other 
elements of a comprehensive financial package are: 
• Explicit consideration for the health of the real sector 
• Strengthening the legislative framework for bank operations 
• Ensuring safety of deposits 
• Management of non-performing assets 
• Review of the capital structure of financial institutions 
• Development of the human capital of the Financial system 
• Change in ownership of financial institutions 
• External liberalization and financial openness 
• Enhancement of the information base for the financial system 
Analysis of financial sector reforms in Africa 
Most African countries embarked on comprehensive financial sector reforms without 
taking the financial health of the real sector into consideration. This has varied 
implications for sequencing and speed of implementation of reform. On the other hand, 
African countries seem to have avoided the pitfalls of Latin American countries as 
regards adopting policies of external liberalization and financial openness. 
• Other conclusions that can be drawn from a content analysis of financial 
sector reforms in Africa are: 
• Most African countries implemented reforms involving the policy of 
exchange rate adjustment. 
• Strengthening of prudential regulations is yet to be done in some countries 
involved in financial reforms. 
• Deposit insurance is not yet in vogue in Africa. 
• Not enough attention has been paid to the development of the information 
and human capital of the financial system. 
• Changes in ownership of financial institutions seem to be easier in 
nationalized financial systems. 
• Only a few countries gave explicit consideration to sequencing issues and 
speed of implementation of reforms. 
Policy issues 
Policy credibility and consistency are critical in the success of any economic reform 
package macroeconomic stability, which is important to the stability and efficiency of 
the financial system. Financial reform policies, moreover, must recognize the dual role 
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of the interest rate both as a return on and a cost of investment. Further, the development 
of information and human capital within the financial system should be given top 
priority to ensure the success of reforms. 
Bank-centred development strategy needs to be strengthened by promoting ownership 
of equity in firms by institutional investors. There is no need for an inflexible and 
doctrinaire transplant of the market-centred development strategy of the capital market 
in Britain and America. However policy issues related to the creation of agencies to 
manage non-performing loans are important in the design and implementation of 
financial reforms. 
Finally, the paper points out that the role of government as regulator and player in the 
financial system often leads to conflict of interest. 
Policy-research link and other issues 
It is important to establish a framework for assuring that the results of policy research 
are fed into the policy-making process. This will sharpen the focus and relevance of the 
research and improve the viability of the policies. Two research foci come to mind: 
subregional and continental. Some of the themes or topics that such a link can address 
include: 
• The incidence and macroeconomic impact of financial distress in Africa. 
• The social cost of comprehensive financial reforms on the poor and other 
vulnerable groups. 
• Design and optimal sequencing of financial sector reforms in Africa. 
• Evolution of financial reforms, their successes, pitfalls and lessons. 
Comments and Discussion 
Discussant: Governor Yansané, Central Bank of Guinea 
Governor Yansané commented that the paper was pessimistic in its assessment of the 
outcomes of financial sector reforms. Reform should be seen as a long process, given 
the previous poor state of the sector. Guinea has closed many of its banks abruptly, 
managed credit tightly and introduced new regulations, deposit protection and bank 
management structures. These irreversible measures, he said, decisively demonstrated 
government credibility and reduced inflation. Though credit remains short—term and 
investment is low, lack of finance is only one constraint on the private sector. It is often 
less important than the lack of business and financial training of entrepreneurs. 
He agreed with the sequencing discussed in the paper — inflation control, bank 
restructuring, stable interest rates, elimination of the parallel market and then indirect 
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monetary policy. He also agreed that banks are unable or unwilling to provide finance 
to rural areas due to problems with collateral and loan recovery, and high administration 
costs. He proposed that governments and donors cooperate in creating separate 
community based rural finance systems and in research on these issues. 
Discussion from the Floor 
The discussion centred on the treatment of distressed banks. Some suggested that banks 
currently have little incentive to collect loans, because they feel they will be "bailed 
out" by government or donors. They therefore tend towards "adverse selection" 
(investment in riskier areas). Strong views were expressed against deposit insurance 
(which might create "moral hazard" among lenders and borrowers and encourage 
"fictitious" deposits) and against abrupt bank closures (because of disruption confidence 
in the financial system). Non—performing assets agencies were generally felt to have 
been very positive, particularly in the transparency of their collection procedures, and 
preferable to ad hoc bank restructuring. There is no "optimum" number of banks in a 
country1 but competition is critical, and effective regulation and on—site supervision are 
vital preconditions of "free entry and exit". In view of the discussion, a priority for 
additional research was felt to be further study of how bank distress has been overcome 
in CFA and non-CFA countries. 
There was some discussion of whether central banks should be independent of finance 
ministries, to enable them to perform their regulatory function. Views differed, with 
some suggesting that reporting to the presidency was worse and consultation between 
finance ministries and central bank was preferable. The issue deserves further 
examination. 
There was strong agreement that in most countries the current design of financial sector 
reform is not providing sufficient finance for the productive sectors (especially small 
and medium enterprises). Other measures suggested to reinforce financial sector reform 
were strengthening the legal system, especially bankruptcy law and reducing bank 
intermediation costs by improving communications infrastructure and cutting labour 
costs. It was also thought necessary to assure flexibility in introducing new financial 
sector regulations to avoid negative effects on intermediation and to encourage national 
social insurance funds. Rural community or "people's" banks need to be established. 
Above all, it was felt that each country had something to teach others, and that more 
study is urgently needed. 
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B: The Informal Financial Sector 
Informal Sector Finance 
Author: E. Aryeetey, Ghana 
Presenter: A. Soyibo, Nigeria 
Summary of Paper 
Introduction 
Few African countries are without informal financial activities. Various studies carried 
out by AERC researchers have identified a number of different informal financial 
'institutions'. These include savings and credit associations (SCA) rural savings and 
credit cooperatives and professional moneylenders. Part-time moneylenders, such as 
estate owners, traders, grain millers, small holder farmers, employers, relations and 
friends are all important sources of informal finance. In West Africa, susu collectors, 
mobile bankers, money guards are also common, as are urban credit unions. 
Most of these may be found in both urban and rural areas. The prevalence of one 
institution or the other varies across countries. Recent researches provide great insight 
into their functioning as they begin to establish the sizes of informal financial sectors in 
a number of countries and trends in links with formal financial institutions. The analyses 
of operations, performance and impacts of informal units in economies undergoing 
structural adjustment are of great interest for their policy implications. 
One of the most important outcomes of these analyses has been to establish the structure 
of informal financial markets in Africa. The markets are deeply segmented and 
transactions in one segment hardly ever affect transactions in others. The large number 
of operating units the variety of types and the minimal interaction among them, makes 
us describe the markets as fragmented. This high level of fragmentation and the limited 
information about the various segments for economic analysis have often made 
considerations of informal finance in policy matters intractable. 
The research shows that informal finance, is, in many countries, is as large as formal 
finance, and in some probably larger. It is especially interesting that, in the period 
following the liberalization of many economies, informal finance has grown faster than 
formal finance, which contradicts the accepted notion that informal finance was due to 
repressive policies. Informal finance will do well in any growing economy in which 
formal finance fails to reach specific niches in the market. 
Regulation should be designed so as to encourage or provide an incentive for the 
expansion of informal units into semi-formal lending units, and incentives for banks to 
channel credit through such semi-formal units. Governments need to abandon a passive 
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attitude to mainstream informal finance and accelerate its transformation and growth 
by reducing market distortions and overcoming institutional inadequacies. 
Governments require a more "proactive approach", including a legal, regulatory and 
prudential framework to foster and accelerate financial market development. Such a 
framework would encompass the mechanisms, institutions and instruments to promote 
and facilitate market development as the economy grows and market functions expand. 
Regulation should avoid restrictive law and focus on removing obstacles. Restrictions 
on the types of assets banks may hold could be modified to encourage investment in 
semi-formal financial institutions. This requires the diversification of formal sector 
instruments. 
Unfortunately, in many countries informal finance has not had the desired impact on 
production due to the nature of informal financial products. They do not satisfy the 
requirements of potential entrepreneurial borrowers. For many expanding micro 
businesses, informal loans often have too short a maturity period, excessive interest 
rates, and insufficient loan amounts. 
Integration with formal sector 
Experience shows that economic growth which propels increasing informal activity 
can modifiy in the ways in which lenders structure their businesses. As they expand, 
they try to link more closely with the banking system: This could, in principle, open up 
the financial systems in many countries. Policy makers need to encourage a closer 
interaction between the formal and informal sectors. Where this has happened, as in 
parts of West Africa, semi-formal institutions have emerged, which lend themselves 
readily to regulation and supervision by the appropriate authorities. 
The result is modern companies, registered and visible in their operations. This is an 
essential requirement for them to reach a large number of customers and gain access to 
the banking facilities. This link to the banking system ensures that the usual tools for 
regulating money supply affect their operations and the way banks relate to them. Being 
major deposit mobilizers, they have a role to play in controlling the supply of money 
that would otherwise remain outside the banking system. 
Regulating the in formal sector 
It is our view that policy makers need not expend resources on regulating and 
supervising informal financial units. Any attempt to do so would force them 
underground. Indeed most African administrative structures possess little knowledge 
of informal institutions and are therefore ill-equipped to monitor and regulate the large 
number of such organizations. Administrators have often, therefore, been tempted to 
apply repressive instruments to coerce an informal sector response. The best time to 
introduce regulation is when informal lending units have expanded, in response to 
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demand, into semi-formal units that can no longer be efficiently kept out of the public 
eye. 
Comments and Discussion 
Discussant: Deputy Governor Odozi, 
Central Bank of Nigeria 
Deputy Governor Odozi commented that many governments used to see the informal 
sector as a response to "financial repression", but evidence now indicates that it also 
has a valuable role to play in filling gaps in a liberalized system. Semi—formal institutions 
such as people's banks and other community savings schemes provide valuable 
intermediation and links to the formal sector as well as a potential channel for formal— 
informal integration. On the other hand, finance houses do nothing to mobilize savings. 
However, governments and donors are only beginning to design a policy framework 
for the informal financial sector; this is a rich area for further research. They still have 
many barriers to overcome: the prejudice of associating informal with "black" markets; 
the lack of constantly—maintained and comprehensive data on the informal sector" and 
a dynamic framework to analyse how to integrate the formal and informal sectors. 
He called for positive policy measures to encourage informal and semi—formal 
institutions while strengthening prudential regulation and supervision, as opposed to 
the current passive policy stance in most countries. The balance between encouragement 
and regulation would vary by institution — for example, pyramid schemes would be 
tightly regulated or discouraged. 
Finally, he suggested areas for further research: 
• Semi—formal institutions (function, regulation, links with formal); 
• Systematic data collection on these institutions; and 
• How policy makers and researchers could cooperate in this area. 
Discussion from the Floor 
Francophone policy makers indicated that the description of the anglophone informal 
financial sector in the paper also applied largely to francophone countries, where it is 
usually more widespread. The main institutions are ton tines,, which have low default 
rates (in contrast to donor credit lines or cooperatives) and important intermediation 
functions, but which largely finance consumption. 
Some additional informal financing mechanisms were highlighted. A credit in kind 
through goods (for example from wholesalers to retailers) finances a large proportion 
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of informal sector trade. Much finance comes from nationals of African countries who 
live overseas and want to repatriate some of their foreign exchange earnings informally. 
Current research work could be extended to cover these institutions. 
Many participants provided explanations for the persistence of the informal sector after 
liberalization: 
• The exclusion of certain groups (women, the poor, rural dwellers, ethnic minorities) 
from the formal system. Research was suggested on how formal or semi—formal 
institutions could reach these groups. 
• Complex procedures to access funds supplied by the formal sector and many donors. 
Participants also suggested that donors might have a role to play in financing 
informal institutions in order to reach the poor. One country cited the example 
of French financial support for a comprehensive network of mutual credit 
unions in the rural areas. Another cited the increasingly positive attitude of 
the Bretton Woods institutions to these issues. 
• Socio—cultural factors. These encourage informal community groupings and 
keep default rates low in contrast to the ineffectiveness of formal sector 
guarantees and collateral which would undermine any attempts to formalize 
these institutions. 
Regulation was seen as very complex. Non—bank financial institution laws are usually 
very tough but not enforced/enforceable for informal institutions. Though some 
countries are revising them to apply to the informal sector, this is difficult because the 
institutions take so many different forms. Self—regulation might be better, letting 
institutions fail and encouraging clients to monitor them rather than relying on the 
central bank. Positive examples of combining regulation and semi—formalization with 
encouragement were mentioned, notably the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Much more 
investigation is needed, especially of examples from inside and outside Africa where 
informal or semi—formal institutions have financed micro—enterprise investment. 
6. 
The Overall Macro Agenda: 
Interactions and Sequencing 
Authors: M. Martin, External Finance for Africa 
L. Kasekende, Uganda 
Presenter: L. Kasekende, Uganda 
Summary of paper 
Introduction 
This paper examines the overall macroeconomic policy research agenda. It goes beyond 
the individual policy sets, discussed in earlier sessions, in two ways. It examines research 
on the formulation and implementation of overall economic programmes (particularly 
their sequencing, consistency and credibility). And it draws attention to other neglected 
policy areas which are crucial to long-term development. 
In the last ten years, most African countries have adopted structural adjustment 
programmes to correct imbalances in their economies. Many countries have made 
significant progress with stabilization, and the paper describes the positive results in 
Uganda. However, removing earlier distortions has revealed new problems and 
challenges, due to weak and unstable markets and limited administrative capacity. 
Gaps in research 
Little of the existing research has analysed the formulation of overall policy programmes. 
There are few studies of sequencing, consistency or credibility in the context of differing 
national characteristics and initial conditions (such as level of development and 
adaptability to change, policy making and administrative capacity, ownership, political 
economy, information flows). 
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The literature on sequencing (except in a few over-studied areas) is frequently confusing, 
or suggests simultaneous "advances on all fronts". This has led policy makers to design 
programmes on the basis of political or administrative capacity or negotiating pressures. 
Most African countries have therefore departed from the few elements of consensus in 
the literature and focused excessively on stabilization and liberalization rather than 
broader "structural" adjustment policies. 
Research has highlighted the pursuit of incompatible or inconsistent policies as a major 
danger to the sustainability of adjustment programmes. However, the paper shows 
how even "compatible" stabilization policies can unexpectedly prove incompatible in 
a liberalized environment. This has forced unwelcome choices among macroeoconomic 
targets, or trade-offs among policy objectives. One example is the recent "Uganda 
Disease" of exchange rate appreciation, which potentially creates sustainability problems 
for the overall programme. 
Research vs Reality 
The role of the state, when mentioned in macroeconomic research, is often confined to 
implementing credible stabilization and liberalization policies. Debates continue over 
whether credibility is enhanced by "big bang" or "gradualist" reform, or by 
preannouncement or "lock-ins" of policy change. Policy makers have found that the 
reality is more subtle. Credibility is extremely hard to establish due to poor information 
and data, market imperfections and perverse incentives for the private sector. There 
are also many "grey areas", where neither African nor developed-world policy makers 
have certain policy remedies. Excessively rapid transitions to free markets can exacerbate 
these problems and undermine policy sustainability — notably by reducing availability 
of information. However, beyond certain core functions, the role of a more active, 
market-friendly state in Africa remains unclear. 
Research and Policy Rrecommendations 
Based on these findings, the paper contains a rich list of recommendations for future 
research cooperation between policy makers and researchers and reinforces the 
recommendations of earlier sessions to deepen our research into existing "core" AERC 
areas: 
• Promotion of savings and investment, especially in private sector and 
financial sector deepening. 
• Detailed implementation of stabilization; for example, policies to combat 
the structural (as well as the monetary) causes of inflation, mobilize budget 
revenue and change the composition of expenditure. 
• Detailed design of trade liberalization, including tariff reform in the context 
of inadequate customs services, and export promotion links. 
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The paper also urges a widening of the agenda to focus on the real economy and on the 
key "enabling factors" in longer-term development: 
• Public enterprise reform and private sector promotion; 
• Administrative, capacity-building and labour market reforms; 
• Policies to combat unemployment and underemployment, to maximize 
training and human capital formation; 
• Policies to promote technological progress, industrialization, agricultural 
revival and physical infrastructure developments; and 
• The huge field of sustainable human development: education, health, gender, 
population, income distribution, the environment. 
The following research questions about macro programme formulation are posed: 
• What is a desirable and sustainable ultimate degree of stabilization (fiscal, 
monetary, exchange rate)? Are the ultimate targets a particular level of price 
or surplus, or a relative degree of stability? 
• What is the desirable and sustainable sequencing of adjustment. In particular, 
how do we accelerate implementation of structural, "real economy" and 
"human development" policies? 
• Given the trade-offs among "compatible" policies, what is the relative 
importance of different "price" and real economy targets? 
• What is the desirable role of the state, and how can governments best promote 
credibility and an enabling environment? 
• What are the key long-term objectives of economic policy (narrowly-defined 
growth or broader sustainable human development) and the key enabling 
conditions for achieving these (technological progress, financial deepening, 
industrialization, agricultural revival, domestic savings and investment, 
physical infrastructure, human capital formation)? How do current 
macroeconomic targets enhance these? 
• What are the macroeconomic policy implications of different sources of 
external financing (different aid types, various private capital flows)? How 
can we maximize the absorption and productivity of these flows, and 
ultimately reduce dependence on them by enhancing savings? 
Finally the paper suggests avenues of cross-country cooperation between policy makers 
and researchers: 
• Joint research projects, in which researchers could provide literature surveys 
and comparative analysis of non-African experience and a longer-term 
outlook, freed from the "fire-fighting" by policy makers; 
• Issue-specific workshops on current policy issues (indirect monetary policy, 
private capital flows) for which researchers could prepare background papers 
and act as resource persons; 
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• Joint compilation of more accurate and detailed data, to which researchers 
could contribute by surveying private sector and informal sector motives, 
responses to policies, information needs; and 
• A permanent network for exchanging information among policy makers and 
researchers and for facilitating joint research projects, issue-specific 
workshops and inter-African capacity building. 
Comments and Discussion 
Discussant 1: Professor B. Ndulu, AERC 
Professor Ndulu's comments focused on two issues, going beyond stabilization: the 
transition from controlled to market regimes, and the consistency between short-term 
macro and long-term development policies. The new macroeconomic consensus of 
reform appears to be that: 
• inflation is worse than unemployment, implying forceful inflation control 
via monetary policy, and more tolerance of unemployment. 
• growth depends largely on supply—side incentive and liberalization policies 
rather than effective demand. 
• monetary policies affect prices but not production. 
• fiscal deficits crowd out private investment, and fiscal restraint therefore 
cuts inflation and frees funds for the private sector. 
However, many countries are having problems with this consensus due to the 
shallowness and imperfections of their markets. Among the major problems and areas 
for further research are how to increase savings and investment by mobilizing domestic 
resources and their links to aid dependence, macro and civil instability, internal and 
external debt, and monetary policy need investigation. Translating resources into growth 
through focus on investment productivity, infrastructure and human capital 
development is also critical. 
He noted that macro policy effectiveness depends heavily on credibility and consistency 
in financial sector reform and market liberalisation, as well as microeconomic responses 
to macroeconomic policies. 
Further study is also needed into mechanisms for coping with external shocks — excesses 
or shortfalls of capital, different motives of private capital (investment or speculation), 
and the monetary and exchange rate policy response. In addition, trade—offs and 
sequencing of reforms, particularly the tension between growth/employment and 
inflation control, are critical areas in need of investigation. 
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Discussant 2: Mme. 0. Mane, 
Ministry of Finance, Senegal 
Mme. Mane focused on the credibility of macroeconomic policy and the role of 
government. She argued that more research is needed on the conflicts and lack of 
credibility caused by the different demands of interest groups within countries — and 
by the international institutions and donors. These conflicts lead often to inconsistency 
through abrupt changes of policy. It is not surprising that private sector actors then 
respond — quite rationally — to this inconsistency and lack of credibility by decreasing 
investment. 
In order to overcome these problems, governments need time to develop a clear vision 
of their short— and longer—term aims, which the demands of internal and external 
negotiations often prevent. They would not sacrifice the long—term for the short—term, 
an all too common situation given the need for immediate measures. This vision might 
be easier to develop if governments adopted a genuinely "bottom—up" approach to 
designing longer—term development policy by consulting their people systematically. 
More research is needed on how programmes are currently designed and how they can 
be adapted to a bottom—up, long—term approach. 
Discussion from the Floor 
The discussion highlighted that most countries had taken insufficient account of 
sequencing, credibility and consistency in designing their macroeconomic programmes. 
There was agreement that this reflects the pressure of negotiations, cross—conditionality 
and the lack of sufficient technical staff with the capacity to adapt the "macro consensus" 
to African countries' conditions. However, one participant warned that these are highly 
political issues, which are not always amenable to technical solutions. Another suggested 
that in his country, "shock treatment" and irreversible measures (rather than gradualism) 
have worked well, though some inconsistencies remain. 
There was general agreement that the role of government in the liberalized system and 
government's interactions with the private sector are priorities for further research. 
Most agreed that governments have little long—term vision, and that even some core 
government economic agencies lack ownership of current short—term programmes. 
Bottom—up development and national ownership of the programmes was felt to imply 
not just multi-party democracy but decentralization and involvement of local NGOs in 
policy discussions, to get beyond interest groups. Governments also need to analyse 
potential costs and benefits of all policies — especially to civil servants responsible for 
their execution — and to consult potential winners and losers before implementation. 
Other key factors in the transition from stabilization to growth were identified: the 
quality of fiscal reforms (i.e. types of expenditure and revenue measures rather than 
global aggregates), which influences foreign capital flows; the upgrading of 
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administrative capacity and retention of existing capacity in order to design longer— 
term programmes; debt relief to remove the debt overhang as a disincentive to 
investment; and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector (economic, 
social, administrative, legal and infrastructure). There was debate over which type of 
external shock is worse: insufficient capital inflow or too much capital inflow. 
Other ideas suggested for further research were export diversification, import 
rationalization (though a project had just been completed on this by six African 
governments) and measures to accelerate the overall supply response as well as savings 
and investment. 
7. 
The Policy Process 
Author and Presenter J Hoffman, AERC 
Summary of Paper 
Introduction 
AERC is widely regarded as having developed a network of African economists. But 
to what extent, are these economists (or their research output) utilized in the economic 
policy development processes of African governments? This paper presents the findings 
of two "policy" studies looking at the relationship between research and policy in Ghana, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire. 
It considers the features of formal and informal economic policy decision making and 
the extent to which policy makers draw upon African economic research and the related 
professional skills in each country. Perceptions of the linkage or absence of linkage 
between economic research and policy decision making are reported. 
The policy-making process 
Significant common factors and differences in policy-making processes across countries 
were found, including: 
• The creation of super-ministries, typically combining finance and national 
development planning, and a decline in the role of national planning 
commissions as an instrument of economic policy in most countries. 
• Varied use of presidential commissions or consultative bodies to develop 
consensus on economic policy. In many countries, inclusion of universities 
or university-based economists has at best been marginal. Although new 
policy/research centres are emerging in all countries, a wider range of 
national policy/research organizations appears active in the francophone 
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countries. However, economics societies at the national level are completely 
absent in the francophone countries visited. Francophone economists do 
not appear to have the same shared sense of an "economics profession" as 
do their anglophone counterparts. 
• A declining role for national central banks in non-core functions such as 
sectoral policy or regional development, and increased Bank attention to 
financial system regulatory issues. BEAC and BCEAO interact with local 
researchers in a markedly different than national central banks in some 
anglophone countries. For example, collaborative research between BEAC 
and BCEAO staff and external researchers is rare. 
• Instability in universities, which affects the output and capacity of researchers 
and influences the way senior government officials look at university-based 
researchers. The academic and institutional "culture" in francophone 
countries is seen as more rigid and specialized; the absence of formal 
collaboration across institutional boundaries is largely attributed to the 
"culture" of the francophone academic environment. Universities are seen 
as "ivory towers" and have generally weak ties to government and business. 
• An unprecedented level of interest in economic research following the recent 
CFA franc devaluation. Economic journalists are perceived as more 
professional in CFA franc countries. 
General perceptions and suggestions on AERC's role 
Most persons interviewed felt that AERC's primary goal should be the development of 
researchers, its secondary goal should be strengthening research-policy linkages. Many 
ideas and suggestions were offered, such as: 
• Broadening opportunities for researchers to provide input and have dialogue 
with policy-makers at the national and regional levels; 
• The development of various communication tools for better linkage of 
researchers and policy makers; 
• Ways to encourage participation by new researchers in the AERC network, 
as well as modifications to AERC's process which might enhance attention 
to the policy relevance of research; and 
• The need for graduate training and professional development to place the 
research process in context with the policy process and develop skills useful 
in policy dialogue. 
Recommendations 
The synthesis report provides several recommendations taking into account AERC's 
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financial and human resource limitations and the need to be realistic about the capacity 
of a pan-African organization to change what is essentially local interaction between 
policy-makers and researchers. Despite these constraints, AERC is well situated to 
bring researchers and policy makers closer together. To some extent, its success can be 
measured in the long-term improvement in the economics profession and the 
policymaking capacity of governments. The report recommends that AERC incorporate 
specific measures into its planning process to enhance the link between research and 
policy making. Recommendations are offered in three distinct areas: 
1) An outreach strategy to increase awareness of AERC among policy-makers and 
potential researchers. Recommendations include: 
• Countries where the objective would be to support efforts of local AIERC 
researchers to connect with local policy makers 
• Countries where the objective would be to identify and locate new researchers 
and key policy makers to make them aware of AERC. 
• "Market testing" among a sample group of senior policy makers could be 
used to design the outreach strategy. 
• A different form of publication may be required for francophone Africa. 
2) An interaction strategy to increase the frequency and quality of dialogue 
between researchers and policy makers. Recommendations include: 
• Ideas on how AERC should continue to support national policy workshops; 
• A more concentrated effort to facilitate research-policy dialogue at the 
regional and sub-regional levels; and 
• An exploration of how future policy seminars might be structured. 
3) An education/training strategy for researchers. The idea is to give researchers a 
better understanding of policy processes and the tools and approaches useful in 
adding value to policy development. Recommendations include: 
• Ways to provide more guidance and feedback to researchers during the 
review of papers and to increase the degree of policy-related discussion and 
feedback during research workshops. 
• A review of graduate training programmes to assess whether current 
curricula could do more to develop economists capable of contributing to 
policy development. 
• Information gathering about the economics profession and the activities and 
specialistions of researchers and potential researchers in Africa. This could 
include a comprehensive data base fed automatically during registration of 
participants in any AERC-supported activity. 
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Comments and Discussion 
The discussion was short of time, but focused on issues in four areas: the cleavage 
between policy makers and researchers, the roles of policy makers and researchers, 
mechanisms to encourage dialogue, and the role of AERC. 
Cleavage between policy makers and researchers 
Problems are both political and practical. Previous repressive political regimes, obsessed 
with confidentiality, often prevented access to information or involvement by 
researchers. Even in open regimes, policy makers tend to require quick answers to 
precise policy questions and commission research in a demand—driven way. Researchers 
however tend to write historical analysis in long, complex projects, which do not promote 
a supply—driven policy process. The problem is exacerbated by the very different service 
terms and conditions in the civil service and universities. Any personnel movement 
tends to be one—way (to civil service), and universities have few staff with government 
experience. 
There is moreover, suspicion between policy makers and researchers because the former 
tend to avoid theory and believe researchers have little practical to contribute. The 
latter are too academic and believe policy makers will not listen. 
This is perhaps more pronounced in the francophone system due to the highly theoretical 
training received in francophone universities 
However, in many countries the barriers are breaking down and cooperation is 
improving, especially due to training in non—African countries where interaction among 
policy makers and researchers is more common. 
The desirable role for researchers and policy makers 
While researchers should be encouraged to become more policy—oriented, especially in 
making their research more user—friendly to policy makers and in working on joint 
research with policy makers, they should not become policy advisers. 
Mechanisms to encourage dialogue and interchange 
Among the suggestions made were more active involvement of academic researchers 
in policy research through joint research projects with policy makers and more 
participation in and research support to national planning commissions and longer— 
term development issues. Local sabbaticals would allow policy makers and researchers 
to move temporarily into each other's sphere. It was also felt vital to involve the wider 
community in the dialogue especially the private sector, economic journalists and 
the general public. 
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The role of AERC 
AERC should continue to facilitate dialogue between the two groups, as in the current 
seminar. Input into future seminars should continue to distil academic research to 
make it usable by policy makers, and the output should be to encourage policy—oriented 
research. However, after this introductory broad seminar, future seminars should focus 
on specific issues (even some of those covered at this seminar) and preferably specific 
research projects, to allow time for indepth exchange of experiences. 

8. 
Working Group Conclusions 
The aims of the working groups were to identify and prioritize major policy research 
issues and to identify mechanisms for pursuing the dialogue begun at the seminar. 
There were four working groups: francophone, anglophone west, anglophone east 
and anglophone south. Their conclusions are presented in aggregate form: while the 
precise wordings of working group findings were slightly different, they were 
surprisingly similar in the research issues and potential follow—up mechanisms they 
identified. 
Research Priorities 
Exchange Rate Policy 
All groups saw a need for more research on the role of exchange rate policy in a 
liberalized economy with a more flexible exchange rate regime. Topics identified 
included. 
• The feasibility/desirability/aim/nature! scope of intervention in the foreign 
exchange market; 
• How to determine the appropriate real exchange rate and short—run target 
range in conditions of distortionary external capital flows; and 
• Defining the objective of policy (competitiveness or lower inflation). 
Such research should take into account the role of other policies influencing 
competitiveness, include a comprehensive assessment of different exchange rate regimes, 
and examine the desirability of indexing to an external anchor. 
The francophone group stressed the need to examine CFA and non—CFA countries 
together in order to learn mutual lessons from semi—fixed and market regimes. It was 
also necessary to explore conditions for harmonizing CFA/non—CFA rates and policies, 
and for subregional/regional currencies and economic integration. 
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Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
On the fiscal side, there was a need to go beyond previous broad research into fiscal 
aggregates and to look at precise revenue and expenditure measures, the budget process 
and long—term fiscal sustainability. Key issues were: 
• How to design and especially implement domestically—driven expenditure 
programmes, and to identify expenditure priorities for long—term growth; 
• How to increase revenue and expand the tax base, especially how or whether 
to tax the informal sector; and 
• Long—term sustainability (and desirable levels of revenue and expenditure 
compared to GDP), as well as the reduction of internal and external debt 
and of dependence on external aid. 
On the monetary side, three groups expressed interest in studying the preconditions, 
transition mechanisms, objectives, targets (reserve money, interest rates) and effective 
methods of indirect monetary control. The anglophone south group also wanted to 
look at prospects for monetary integration. 
Financial Sector 
The issues focused on how to mobilize finance for production, especially: 
• Financial sector distress: how to clean up commercial banks and sequence 
this with financial sector liberalization, in a way that encourages the financing 
of production; 
• The role of new financial market mechanisms and financial deepening; 
• How to finance the rural sector, building on successful experiences; 
• How to overcome market failures and information asymmetry, and their 
implications for the design and sequencing of liberalization; 
• Whether to/how to establish central bank independence; and 
• Informal sector: country—specific studies of the size and characteristics of 
the sector; how to fill the gap between the formal and informal sectors, 
especially in financing SMEs and investment, possibly with semi—formal 
institutions. 
Overall Macroeconomic Programmes 
The top priority research area here was the role of goverment in the liberalized economy. 
This involved the sub—issues of credibility in policy making and private sector response/ 
expectations, administrative capacity, ownership by the wider society, and bottom—up 
development programming. 
The second most important issue — top priority for some countries but unimportant to 
others — was the management of macroeconomic policy in the context of external shocks, 
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especially excessive or insufficient capital inflows. This would involve analysis of the 
sources/nature/purposes of private and aid—based capital inflows, the risks of exchange 
rate appreciation or depreciation, reserves accumulation or depletion, monetary 
sterilization and absorptive capacity issues. 
Third, there was support from three groups for more study of the regional dimensions 
of adjustment, particularly removing trade barriers, monetary integration and exchange 
rate integration. 
Sequencing and sustainability issues were raised by all groups, but in different forms: 
"long—term sustainability", "growth—inflation—unemployment tradeoffs" and "sectoral 
sequencing". Proposals for research in the specific subject areas (especially the financial 
sector) were also made. 
Other issues raised by individual groups included the determinants of foreign 
investment (investment codes/deregulation or wider macro/capital flow factors), 
privatization, private sector promotion and the optimal size of government. 
Follow-up mechanisms 
The top priority identified by three groups (one did not really discuss mechanisms) 
was joint research projects between policy makers and academics at a cross—country 
level, coordinated by AERC, with clear division of labour among policy makers and 
researchers to complement each other. 
The francophone group felt strongly that francophone policy makers had been under— 
represented at the seminar, and suggested a special follow—up meeting with francophone 
policy makers (possibly co—hosted by the BCEAO). The lusophone member of this 
group also suggested that AERC should do more to inform lusophone countries about, 
and involve them in, its research. 
Other ideas emerging were: 
• A regional network of seminar participants, with a named contact point in 
each country, to pursue follow-up; 
• A directory of polic-oriented (and other) researchers in Africa listing 
specialization and experience of policy; 
• Issue-specific follow-up seminars, and urgent dissemination of the results 
of the seminar, especially to donors; 
• More national policy workshops; 
• Involvement of wider groups — business, religious, media, NGOs; and 








As is normal in AERC workshops, participants were asked to evaluate the seminar in 
writing, using a predesigned form. A sample form is attached to this report as Annex 
C. Overall, the evaluation was extremely positive: one member of a working group 
suggested that policy makers were left "panting for more". Another said it had been 
an "eye—opener" for policy makers about AERC and the potential for cooperation among 
policy makers and researchers. 
In answer to specific questions: 
• Every participant found the seminar worthwhile, in almost all cases due to 
the policy maker/researcher interaction and the exchange of experiences 
with other policy makers. 
• All would attend another seminar. Though their priorities for topics varied, 
around half wanted a seminar on the financial sector, on fiscal and monetary 
policy or on relative roles of government and private sector. Other popular 
subjects were regional integration and trade promotion, overall macro—micro 
policies and links, and exchange rates. 
• All but one participant found the seminar a useful way to share ideas and 
experiences with counterparts from other countries, especially on indirect 
monetary policy, exchange rate policy and financial sector. (The exception 
was a francophone/lusophone policy maker who complained about the poor 
quality of interpretation into French). 
• All suggested they would be more likely to use AERC researchers and 
research materials in future policy—relevant research. 
• All but one suggested that the research presented had added to their 
knowledge of policy issues, especially through the informal financial sector 
and overall macro agenda papers (and secondarily the financial sector reform, 
fiscal and monetary and exchange rate papers), and by allowing them to 
share experiences and gather empirical evidence. 
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° All but one found that the seminar had provoked ideas for future interaction 
among policy makers and researchers in their own countries, including joint 
research, seminars, staff exchanges, cooperation in "policy units" or working 
groups, production and dissemination of executive summaries, and collecting 
data. 
The questionnaire asked whether enough time was allocated to the various sessions. 
In general, the duration of sessions was felt to be about right, particularly on the exchange 
rate. However, a quarter of participants felt more time was needed for fiscal and 
monetary policy, financial policy and the overall macro agenda; a third for the research 
process; and half for the working groups. Only one policy maker said a session (the 
financial sector) had been too long. Some also commented at the end of the evaluation 
form that the working groups were too short and that too many subjects had been 
covered. While there was an understanding that this seminar needed to cover a wide 
range of subjects in order to show AERC's expertise, many requested that future seminars 
focus in depth on individual session topics or sub—topics. 
Participants assessed in general the quality of written presentations, oral presentations 
and executive summaries. The written presentations ranked very highly; the oral 
presentations and the executive summaries slightly lower. However, corridor 
conversations indicated some confusion as to whether "executive summaries" meant 
those of the seminar papers, or those of AERC research papers that were also prepared 
for and distributed at the seminar. 
In ranking the relative worth of individual papers, there was also confusion as to whether 
1 meant high or low. However, inverting the order of the rankings to conform with 
each participant's answers to questions about which papers were most useful and 
informative, produces the same result as excluding the confused responses. As a result, 
it it clear that the sessions rated most highly were those on the overall macro agenda, 
the exchange rate and the financial sector. These results also fit with the negative 
assessment of the working groups because they were allowed insufficient time. 
Around 80% of participants favoured each of the specific suggestions for follow—up 
made in the questionnaire: putting them on AERC's mailing list, inviting them to another 
policy seminar, encouraging joint policy research projects between researchers and policy 
makers, encouraging national policy workshops and establishing a mechanism for 
constant exchange of information between policy makers and researchers. Other 
suggestions included establishing a national "contact point" in each country to promote 
involvement in cross—country policy research projects; reinforcing AERC's translation 
service to provide more output in French and Portuguese; widening the participation 
to more countries or to larger groups of staff from a smaller number of countries; 
linking more closely with policy units and planning commissions; and establishing a 
permanent communication network structure among the participants and other policy 
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makers and policy—oriented researchers. 
On key future research issues, the top priorities were exchange rate policy (10), 
expanding fiscal revenue (9) and overcoming financial sector distress (8). Other 
prominent issues were the role of government in a liberalized economy (6), 
macroeconomic sequencing (5), indirect monetary targets and policy (4), how to finance 
SMEs innovatively (4), investment and savings (3), private sector promotion and 
privatization (3), capital flows and external shocks (2) and informal finance (2). Also 
raised were data quality, capital markets, regional integration, export diversification, 
labour markets, the future of the CFA zone, and debt. 
On the seminar arrangements, at least three—quarters of the participants rated the timing 
of the invitation, the travel arrangements, the accommodations and the venue as 
excellent, and the other quarter rated them good. Four participants were disappointed 
with the content of the invitation, rating it "adequate" or "fair", due to a feeling that it 
had not adequately described the richness of the seminar. Half the participants rated 





This summarizes the overall findings of the seminar, and suggests ways in which AERC 
might respond. Its framework has been set by the proceedings and conclusions of the 
seminar, especially the working groups and the participant evaluations. It is also based 
on several discussions with AERC senior staff (especially Professor Ndulu and Dr. 
Elbadawi), and on the summary by Dr. Elbadawi of AERC's response in his reply to 
the working group presentations in the closing session of the seminar (In his response 
he stressed AERC's existing mechanisms for encouraging policy maker—researcher 
cooperation and the need to look beyond Africa and avoid policy advocacy.) 
The seminar fully achieved all of its aims, as specified in Part 1. As shown in particular 
by the participants' answers to the seminar evaluation questionnaire, it improved 
prospects for policy involvement by interested AERC researchers, increased AERC 
visibility in the policy making community, identified possible areas of policy research 
for AERC—funded researchers to consider and provided an opportunity for policy makers 
and researchers to exchange experiences and views. In addition, participants produced 
many ideas for additional mechanisms to increase AERC visibility and coordination of 
policy research in Africa. This concluding section therefore has the task only of choosing 
and refining the best ideas of the seminar participants, and matching them with what it 
is feasible for AERC to achieve. 
Research Agenda 
There is no doubt that the seminar achieved the aim of widening and deepening the 
policy research agenda. Each of the sessions on policy areas produced at least one 
coherent set of issues that could be researched, according to the discussion in the sessions, 
the conclusions of the working groups and the priorities of the evaluations. In turn, 
these were: 
• The role of exchange rate policy in a liberalized economy, especially the scope 
for intervention in forex markets; 
• The process of budget formulation and execution, especially on new sources 
of revenue mobilization; 
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• The implementation of indirect monetary policy; 
• How to encourage investment in production (especially medium, small and 
micro enterprises) through enhanced financial sector reform, better—designed 
measures to overcome bank distress and the encouragement of informal 
financial markets; 
• The role and credibility of government; and 
• Macroeconomic responses to external shocks in the form of excess or 
insufficient external capital flow. 
The issue is how to study these topics. Some of them are already being covered by 
existing projects — notably the second, through AERC's budget process study and the 
last, through a SIDA - funded project on the macroeconomic implications of capital 
flows. The seminar has already had a valuable input into the design of both of these 
projects, and into identifying policy maker participants. The particular lessons for the 
content of the projects were: 
• The need to focus on revenue as much as expenditure, and on budget 
implementation as much as design, in the budget study; and 
• The need to balance countries with excess capital flow and those with 
insufficient flows, in the capital flow study. In addition, it might be possible 
to enhance cooperation between ESAIDARM and AERC by involving AERC 
researchers in the capital flows—reserves study. AERC should initiate contacts 
with ESAIDARM to this end. 
Four projects remain, of which three (exchange rate, indirect monetary policy and 
investment in production) fit into existing AERC thematic areas. It is strongly 
recommended that AERC take the lead in sponsoring three cross—country comparative 
research projects in these areas, to be conducted by country teams of policy makers and 
researchers from selected countries. 
These projects would need to be carefully structured to ensure clear and productive 
division of labour among researchers and policy makers. For example, researchers 
could contribute surveys of literature and of non—African experiences, theoretical 
background papers, econometric modelling, and sample surveys of the private sector. 
Policy makers could identify key issues in each country to ensure policy relevance, and 
analyse government data, institutional capacities and current policy thinking. 
In order to finalize the design of such projects and to pursue the follow—up of the seminar, 
it is recommended that AERC hold a meeting of a Policy Research Working Group, 
inviting six participants from the seminar (i.e., one policy maker and one researcher 
interested in each of the project areas), as soon as possible. These participants would 
take responsibility for advising AERC on general follow—up and for pursuing the 
formation of project teams and the finalization of research project design. 
The fourth project — the role and credibility of government — does not appear to fit into 
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AERC's immediate research agenda. Instead, it is recommended that AERC raise this issue 
in other fora more interested in political economy issues — for example, the Global 
Coalition for Africa — and suggest cooperation between political economy and economic 
analysts in a study of these issues covering African and non-African countries. 
Many other topics and sub-topics were suggested which would be best pursued by 
sub-groups of countries or by individual groups of policy makers and researchers, or 
by being fed into any future design of projects in these issue areas by AERC researchers, 
to make them more policy-relevant. Therefore dissemination of the seminar report, as 
well as ongoing AERC research reports to the widest possible policy makers and 
researchers is desirable. 
Other Follow-up Mechanisms 
The seminar was an extremely successful mechanism for disseminating knowledge of 
AERC's aims, procedures and products to policy makers. In terms of product, both the 
seminar papers and the executive summaries of other papers were very well received. 
Several of the policy makers had virtually no knowledge of AERC products, and 80% 
asked to be put on AERC's mailing list. 
However, the seminar itself was small (for purposes of fruitful discussion) and reached 
relatively few policy makers. The question is how to disseminate the seminar results 
and future AERC products to a wide network of policy makers. It is suggested that 
AERC: 
• Produce three written outputs from the seminar itself: a very brief summary of 
seminar highlights; more detailed report on the seminar; and a full volume 
of proceedings including the text of the papers presented. Each will reach 
different audiences: the first will be useful for senior policy makers; the second 
for seminar participants, research—oriented policy makers and AERC 
researchers; and the third for all those interested in the details of policy— 
oriented research areas. 
• Create a directory of researchers in its network who are interested in policy research 
(or, for other purposes, a directory of all member researchers and their 
research interests, highlighting those who are interested in policy issues), 
and circulate it to African research institutions and governments. 
In future, AERC should make every effort to widen the group of enthusiastic policy 
makers created by the seminar into a permanent network of Africans interested in policy 
research. Each of the policy maker and/or researcher participants in the seminar might be 
requested to act as a "contact point" for AERC in their country, with regard to future policy 
research. Known interested policy makers and researchers in countries which did not 
participate might also be contacted, and asked to serve as contact points. 
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These contact points, as well as the other participants should be asked to name other 
research—oriented policy makers in their country, particularly those in planning 
commissions and policy units. 
The seminar report, copies of the executive summaries of AERC research reports and 
other future relevant AERC outputs, should then be distributed as widely as possible, 
either directly or through named contact points. 
AERC should ensure that more of its researcher members are informed of the results of 
the seminar, in order to involve them in follow-up projects. It might consider devoting 
a plenary day to presentation of the papers and discussions at the senior policy seminar 
(or perhaps a half—day presentation of this report). 
There should be more national policy workshops, and AERC should highlight the 
conclusions of this policy seminar (and the existence of and follow—up policy research 
projects) in future workshops. 
AERC should reinforce links with francophone policy makers, as recommended by the 
francophone working group. Contacts should be made (with advice from existing AERC 
researchers, policy-maker participants in the seminar and advisory committee members) 
with BCEAO and BEAC, in order to organize a presentation of the results of the senior 
policy seminar at one or both of these institutions, and to discuss cooperation on policy- 
oriented research (especially given the findings that almost all issues were similar for 
CFA and non-CFA countries). 
Lusophone policy makers and researchers are particularly poorly served by research 
networks, and both of the lusophone participants in the seminar expressed willingness 
to act as national contact points for AERC. Comparative cross-country research projects 
may provide a unique opportunity to involve these countries in AERC work. In addition, 
AERC might consider exploring further research cooperation with the lusophone African 
countries as a whole, through well-funded mechanisms created by the European Union 
and Portugal. 
Finally, there are lessons for future seminars, above all from the time shortage in the 
meeting. As described above, all of the participants expressed the strong hope that 
AERC would organize similar seminars in future, but that they should focus more closely 
on individual issues. Given that the issues suggested virtually coincide with the 
proposals for policy research projects, it would seem most productive to organize follow- 
up seminars in line with the progress of the research projects. Each of the three research 
projects outlined above could begin with a small seminar to discuss the project issues 
in more detail. Other policy makers and researchers, expert in the project issues, could 
be invited to attend in order to provide input on project design. 
At later stages, other policy makers could be invited to meetings of the project teams in 
order to comment on findings. Obviously, there will remain a need to present new 
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thematic areas (especially trade policy) to the policy making community as AERC 
develops a body of polic-relevant research in these areas. However, such presentations 
should be made in 12-18 months (with a maximum of two issues for discussion), when 
work is already well advanced on the agenda produced by the current seminar and 
lessons are available on the progress of policy research projects. 
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ANNEX A: Programme 
Senior Policy Seminar 
30-31 March, 1995 
Serena Hotel, Nairobi 
Day 1, Thursday 30 March 1995 
9:00 Opening: T. Kibua, Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Kenya 
Benno Ndulu, Executive Director, AERC 
9:30-12:30 Theme I: Exchange Rate Policy (non-CFA and CFA, Foreign 
Exchange Markets) 
Chair: Andrew Mullei, Director, ICEG 
9:30-10:30 Presentation: C. Dordunoo, Ghana 
A. M'Bet, Côte d'Ivoire 
Discussants: C. Kimei, Tanzania 
I. Elbadawi, AERC 
F. Mwega, Kenya 
10:30-11:00 Coffee/tea 
11:00-12:30 Discussion: Exchange Rate Policy 
12:30-2:00 Lunch 
2:00-4:30 Theme II: Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Chair: K. Yansané, Governor, Central Bank of Guinea 
2:00-3:00 Presentation: N. Osoro, Tanzania 
N. Sowa, Ghana 
Discussants: V. Selormey, Ghana 
B. Fall, Senegal 
K. Oussou, Côte d'Ivoire 
3:00-4:30 Discussion: Inflation, Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
4:30-5:00 Coffee/tea 
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5:00-6:00 Theme III: Financial Sector Policy (part 1) 
Chair: V. Selormey, Vice Minister of Finance, Ghana 
5:00-5:30 The Formal Financial Sector 
Presentation: A. Soyibo, Nigeria 
Discussant: K. Yansané, Guinea 
5:30-6:30 Discussion 
Day 2, Friday, 31 March 1995 
8:30-10:00 Theme III: Financial Sector Policy (part 2) 
Chair: V. Odozi, Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria 
8:30-9:00 Informal Sector Finance 
Author: E. Aryeetey, Ghana 
Presentation: A. Soyibo, Nigeria 
Discussant: V. Odozi, Nigeria 
9:00-10:00 Discussion 
10:00-10:30 Coffee/tea 
10:30-12:00 Theme IV: The Overall Macro Agenda: Interactions and 
Sequencing 
Chair: T. Owusu, Deputy Governor, Bank of Ghana 
10:30-11:15 Authors: M. Martin, U.K. and 
L. Kasekende, Uganda 
Presentation: L. Kasekende 
Discussants: Benno Ndulu, AERC 
D. Mane, Senegal 
11:15-12:00 Discussion 
12:00-1:30 Theme V: The Policy Research Process 
Chair: D. Mulaisho, former Governor, Bank of Zambia 
12:00-12:45 Presentation: J. Hoffman, AERC 
Discussants: J. Doriye, Tanzania 
12:45-1:30 Discussion 
1:30-2:30 Lunch 
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2:30-4:15 Working Groups to Prepare Conclusions 
2:30-2:45 Outcome of seminar and framework for working groups 
Presentation: M. Martin, U.K. 
2:45-4:15 Working Groups 
4:15-5:00 Coffee/tea 
5:00-5:45 Closing Session 
Chair: Ibrahim Elbadawi, AERC 
Conclusions: Working group leaders 
5:45-6:15 Closing Remarks 
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ANNEX B: Participant List 
Policy Makers GHANA 
BOTSWANA 
Dr. L.O. Ndzinge 
Deputy Director of Research 
Bank of Botswana 





Dr. Kouassy Oussou 
Lecturer, 
Faculty of Economic Sciences, 
University of Côte d'Ivoire 
B.P.V43 
ABIDJAN, Côte d'Ivoire 
Tel: 225 444062/443126 
Tlx: 26138 RECTU CI 
Fax: 225 443531 /443126 
ETHIOPIA 
Mr. Tegegnework Gettu 
Ministry of Planning & Economic 
Development (UNDP), 
P.O. Box 11127, 
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia. 
Tel: 251 1128954 
Tel Res: 251 1 200119 
Fax: 251 1 553844 
Mr. Stephen Ameyaw 
Ag. Director, Research Department, 
Bank of Ghana 
P.O. Box 2674 
ACCRA, Ghana 
Tel: 233 21 665235 
Tlx: 2050 
Fax: 233 21 662996 
Mrs. Nana Amma Yeboaa 
Deputy Governor, 
Bank of Ghana 





Dr. V. Selormey 
Deputy Minister, 
Ministry of Finance 
P.O. Box M40 
ACCRA, Ghana 
Tel: 233 21 665717 
Fax: 23321 662782 
GUINEA 
M. Kerfella Yansané 
Governor, 
Central Bank of Guinea 
3 Bld. du Commerce 
B.P. 692 
CONAKRY, Guinea 
Tel: 224 412651 
Tix: 22225 BAREG-GE 
Fax: 224 414898 
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GUINEA-BISSA U 
Dr. Issufo Sanha 
Directeur-Général de la Conjoncture et 
Prevision 
Ministère des Finances 
Av. Domingos Ramos, CP 67 
BISSAU, Guinea-Bissau 
Tel: 245 201967 
Fax: 245 201626 
KENYA 
Dr. T. Kibua 
Deputy Governor, 
Central Bank of Kenya 
P.O. Box 60000 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 254 2226431 
Tlx: 22324 
Fax: 2542 340192 
Prof. Benno J. Ndulu 
Executive Director, 
AERC 
P.O. Box 62882 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542 228057 
Tix: 22480 
Fax: 2542 219308 
Dr. Francis Mwega 
Senior Lecturer, 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542 334244 Ext. 28530 
Mr. Francis 0. Ngesa 
Assistant Principal, 
Central Bank of Kenya 
P.O. Box 60000 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542 226431; Tix: 22324 
Fax: 254 2 340192 
Mr. B.A. Korir 
Deputy Director of Research, 
Central Bank of Kenya, 




Fax: 2542 340192 
MOZAMBIQ LIE 
Dr. Antonio Abreu 
Research Advisor to Governor, 
Banco de Mocambique 
Av. 25 de Setembro No. 1695 
P.O. Box 423 
MAPUTO, Mocambique 
Tel: (258-1) 428442 
Fax: (258-1) 421915 
NIGERIA 
Dr. V. Odozi 
Deputy Governor, 
Central Bank of Nigeria 
Tinubu Square PMB 12194 
LAGOS, Nigeria 
Tel: 266 8109909/8100100 
Tlx: 
Fax: 266 8108813 
SENEGAL 
Mr. Babakar Fall 
Chef de Division, 




Tel: 221 23 0050 
Fax: 221 23 0743 
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Mme. Diarietou Gaye Mane 
University of Manchester 
Sheavyn House, Ashburne Hall 
Old Hall Lane, Fellowfield 
MANCHESTER M14 6HP, U.K. 
Tel: 44 61 275 7788 
Fax: 4461 275 4928 
Dr. C. Kimei 
Director of Economic & Statistics, 
Bank of Tanzania 
P.O. Box 2939 
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania 
Tel: 255 51 21291 ext 2241 
Tix: 41024 BENKUU 
Fax: 255 51 46060 
Professor J. Doriye 
Deputy Secretary 
Planning Commission 
P.O. Box 9242 
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania 
Tel: 255 51 25802 
Fax: 255 51 34723 
Ag. Commissioner 
Macroeconomic Policy 
Ministry of Finance & Economic 
Planning 
P.O. Box 8147 
KAMPALA, Uganda 
Tel: 25641 232571/251796 
Tel Res: 25641 221186 
Fax: 25641 230163 
ZAMBIA 
Dr. Dominic Mulaisho 
P.O. Box 30977 
LUSAKA, Zambia 
Tel: 260 1 229005 
ZIMBABWE 
Mr. F. Pamacheche 
Director, 
Monitoring & Implementation Unit 
Ministry of Finance 
Semor Machel Ave. 
P.O. Box 7705, Causeway 
HARARE, Zimbabwe 
Tel: 263 4 729240 
Tix: MINFIN HARARE 
Fax: 263 4 792750 
Mr. S. Kufeni 
General Manager, 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box 1283 
HARARE, Zimbabwe. 
Tel: 263 4 707771 Ext 30 
Fax: 2634 708976 
CANADA 
Mr. Joseph Hoffman 
Consultant 
83 Cottingham Street 
TORONTO, Canada M4V 1B9 
Tel: 416 967 1492 
Fax: 416 967 0945 
TANZANIA 
UGANDA 
Mr. D. Kitabire 
Authors and Researchers 
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COTE D'IVOIRE 
Prof. Allechi M'Bet 
Professor of Economics, 
Faculté des Sciences Economique et De 
Gestion, 
Université Nationale du Côte d'Ivoire, 01 
B.P.V43 
ABIDJAN, Cote d'Ivoire 
Tel: 225 444062 
Tel Res: 225 443175 
Tix: 26138 RECTU CI 
Fax: 225 449858 
NIGERIA 
Dr. Adedoyin Soyibo 
Reader, 
Department of Economics, 
University of Ibadan 
IBADAN, Nigeria 
Tel: 234 2 810 4635/4 
Tel Res: 234 2 810 4115 
Tlx: 31590 ncema ng 
Fax: 2342 8100505 
TANZANIA 
GHANA Dr. Nehemia E. Osoro 
Senior Lecturer, 
Dr. N.K. Sowa 
Senior Lecturer, 
Department of Economics 
University of Ghana 
P.O. Box 57, Legon 
ACCRA, Ghana 
Tel: 233 21 669618 Pager 5165 
Tlx: 2556; Fax: 233 21 227656 
Dr. C. Dordunoo 
Senior Lecturer, 
GRIMPA, Green Hill 
P.O. Box 50, Achimota 
Legon, ACCRA, Ghana 
Tel: 233 21 667682/3/4/5 
Tel Res: 233 21 660116 
Tix: 2551 GIMPA, GH 
Fax: 23321 667681 
Dr. E. Aryeetey 
Department of Economics, 
ISSER 
University of Ghana 
P.O. Box 74, Legon 
ACCRA, Ghana 
Tel: 233 21 775181 
Tix: 2164 RIPS GH 
Fax: 233 21 665801 
Department of Economics, 
University of Dar es Salaam 
P.O. Box 35045 
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania 
Tel: 255 51 43255 
Fax: 255 51 43255 
UGANDA 
Dr. Louis Kasekende 
Executive Director, 
Research and Policy Department, 
Bank of Uganda 
P.O. Box 7120 
KAMPALA, Uganda 
Tel: 25641 259866 
Fax: 25641 230878 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Dr. Matthew Martin 
External Finance for Africa 
Flat 11 
4 Orsett Terrace 
LONDON W2 6AZ, U.K 
Tel: 071 262 6797 
Fax: 071 262 7697 
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Observers 
ETHIOPIA 
Dr. Oyugi Aseto 
Head, Division of Research, Planning & 
Population, 
OAU 
P.O. Box 3243 
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia 
Tel: 577700/510290 
KENYA 
Prof. Terry Ryan 
Department of Economics, 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542 334244 
Tlx: 22095 
Fax: 2542 336885 
Mr. Harris Mule 
Electricity House, 
P.O. Box 30577 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 254 2 228206 
Ms. Peninah W. Kariuki 
Economist, 
IMF Resident Office 
P.O. Box 46301 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 254 2 221714 
Fax: 254 2 335084 
Mr. Carilus Odero Odumbe 
Senior Research Officer, 
Central Bank of Kenya 
P.O. Box 60000 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 254 2 226431 Ext 2297 
Mrs. Mercy N. Mwangi 
Senior Economist, 
Central Bank of Kenya 
P.O. Box 60000 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542226431 
Mr. Charles Gitari Koori 
Senior Research Officer, 
Central Bank of Kenya 
P.O. Box 60000 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542226431 
Mr. Haron Sirima 
Research Officer, 
Central Bank of Kenya 
P.O. Box 60000 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542226431 
Mrs. Gillian E. Ngola 
Manager, Publication & Dissemination 
AERC 
P.O. Box 62882 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542 228057 Tix: 22480 
Fax: 254 2 219308 
Mr. James M. Mwangi 
Financial Controller, 
AERC 
P.O. Box 62882 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 254 2 228057 Tlx: 22480 
Fax: 254 2 219308 
Mrs. Rachel K. Gesami 
Manager, Personnel & Administration 
AERC 
P.O. Box 62882 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 254 2 228057 Tlx: 22480 
Fax: 254 2 219308 
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Dr. William Lyakurwa 
Training Coordinator, 
AERC 
P.O. Box 62882 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 2542 228057 
Tix: 22480 
Fax: 254 2 219308 
Dr. Ibrahim A. Elbadawi 
Research Coordinator, 
AERC 
P.O. Box 62882 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
Tel: 254 2228057 
Tix: 22480 
Fax: 254 2 219308 
Dr. Andrew Mullei 
Director, 
International Center for 
Economic Growth (ICEG), 
P.O. Box 55237 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Tel: 254 2 215295 
Fax: 254 2223220 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Ms. Anne Gordon 
Cooperative for Research and 
Eduction (CORE) 
P.O. Box 42440 
FORDSBURG 2033, 
South Africa 
Tel: 27 11 836 9942/5 
Fax: 27 11 836 9944 
ZIMBABWE 
Mr. Ibrahim J. Wani 
The African Capacity Building 
Foundation (ACBF) 
CABS Centre 5th Floor 
Jason Moyo Avenue 
HARARE, Zimbabwe 
Tel: 263 4 702931 /2 
Tlx: 22013 
Fax: 263 4 702915 
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Programme Officer, 
The African Capacity Building 
Foundation (ACBF) 
CABS Centre 5th Floor 




Fax: 263 4 702915 
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ANNEX C: Questionnaire 
QUESTIONNAIRE TO EVALUATE 
THE AERC 1995 SENIOR POLICY SEMINAR 
1. Did you think that attending the AERC Senior Policy Seminar was a worthwhile 
experience? Yes/No 
In what way? 
2. Would you attend another one, on different policy topics? Yes/No 
Which topics? 
3. Was enough time devoted to each topic? 
Not enough Just right Too much 
I. Exchange rates 
II. Fiscal/monetary 
III. Financial sector 
IV. Macro agenda 
V. Policy/research 
VI. Working Groups 
4. Did you think that the AERC research results were effectively synthesized and 
presented? 
Very effective Satisfactory Ineffective 
I. Written papers 
II. Oral presentations 
III. Executive summaries 
5. What, in your view, were the most useful sessions? Please rank them in order of 
preference (1 low - 6 high). 
I. Exchange rates 
II. Fiscal/monetary 
III. Financial sector 
IV. Macro agenda 
V. Policy/research 
VI. Working Groups 
6. Did you find the seminar a useful opportunity to share ideas and experiences 
with your policy-maker counterparts from other countries? 
Yes/No 
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7. Following the seminar, would you be more less (circle one) likely to involve 
AERC researchers in policy analysis? 
8. Following the seminar, would you be more/less (circle one) likely to ensure that 
you or your staff regularly review AERC materials? 
9. Did the research presented add to your knowledge or understanding of the policy 
issue? Yes/No 
10. Which paper added most to your knowledge? 
11. Did the seminar provide you with ideas as to how researchers and policy-mak- 
ers could interact more effectively in your country in the future? 
yes/No 
Examples: 
12. How would you like AERC to follow up on this seminar? 
I. Put you on the mailing list for AERC publications 
II. Invite you to another 
III. Encourage researchers and policy makers in your country to work together on 
policy research projects. 
IV. Encourage national policy workshops in your country 
V. Facilitate an ongoing exchange of information between policy makers and re- 
searchers 
VI. Other 
13. What would you suggest are the three most important areas of policy-related 
research in the near term? 
14. How would you rate the conference arrangements: 
Excellent Good Adequate Fair 
I. Invitation (timing) 
II. Invitation (information) 
III. Travel arrangements 
IV. Accommodation 
V. Seminar venue 
VI. Seminar structure 
Do you have any other comments. 
Name: Country: 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONSORTIUM (AERC) 
The principal objective of the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), established in 1988, is to 
strengthen local capacity for conducting independent, rigorous inquiry into problems pertinent to the 
management of economies in sub-Saharan Africa. In response to special needs of the region, AERC has 
adopted a flexible approach to improve the technical skills of local researchers, allow for regional determination 
of research priorities, strengthen national institutions concerned with economic policy research, and facilitate 
closer ties between researchers and policy makers. AERC is supported by private foundations, bilateral aid 
agencies and international organizations. Further information concerning the AERC and its publications 
can be obtained by writing to: 
Manager, Publication & Dissemination 
African Economic Research Consortium 
8th Floor, International House 
P. 0. Box 62882, Nairobi, Kenya 
Tel: (254-2) 228057 Fax: (254-2) 219308 Telex: 22480 E-mail: AERC@elci.gn.apc.org 
